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Executive Summary 
Background 
Criminalisation is an important aspect of anti-FGM/C policies and programmes. In countries where 
FGM/C is practised, the enactment of a law prohibiting the practice is an important indicator of 
progress towards abandonment. Criminalisation is often seen as playing an important role in the 
declining prevalence of FGM/C. However, there is not much research on the link between the 
enactment of laws that prohibit and criminalise FGM/C and declining prevalence of the practice. The 
objectives of this study, therefore, were to assess the extent to which people obey the law on 
FGM/C; to investigate the reasons and causes that motivate people born into a tradition of FGM/C 
to obey or not to obey a law prohibiting FGM/C; and to establish the legal, policy, and programme 
responses, across varying contexts, that would most effectively reduce the practice of FGM/C. The 
study was conducted in Kenya, where FGM/C is criminalised under the 2001 Children’s Act and the 
2011 Prohibition of FGM Act.  
Methods 
This study used mixed methods, including a desk review of Kenya’s anti-FGM/C laws; key informant 
interviews with community gatekeepers, community leaders, and government officials; focus group 
discussions with women aged 35 and older, women aged 18–34, men aged 35 and older, and men 
aged 18–34; and a quantitative survey of 1,200 respondents from six practising communities. The 
study was conducted in practising communities, with varying prevalence rates ranging from high 
and not declining, and high but declining, to high but recently declining. The study also included one 
non-practising community that neighbours practising communities for purposes of understanding 
cross-ethnic influences around the practice of FGM/C.  
Results 
The results of the study indicate that fear of punishment or the imposition of criminal sanctions is a 
major motivating factor for individuals to obey the law. However, fear of criminal sanctions might 
motivate individuals to practise FGM/C in secrecy rather than to obey the law. The study also found 
that conflicts between formal criminal law and religion or cultural custom can motivate people to 
disobey the law. Another factor that might cause individuals to disobey the law is internal failures 
within the formal law including poor enforcement, failure of law enforcement authorities to follow the 
law, and corruption. Further, the results of the study indicate that despite the enactment of a law 
prohibiting FGM/C, 13% of the studied population would still make the decision to cut women and 
girls in the future.  
Discussion 
While fear of criminal sanctions might motivate people to obey the law prohibiting FGM/C in Kenya, 
there exist factors that motivate people to disobey the law. These factors limit the effectiveness of 
criminal law. Thus, for example it was noted from the results of the study, that fear of criminal 
sanctions might push the practice of FGM/C underground devoid of the original ceremonies. Our 
findings suggest that it is necessary to find meaningful ways to address the inherent conflicts 
between the anti-FGM/C law in Kenya and religion and customs, which are also recognised as 
sources of law. Internal failures of the formal law system also need to be addressed to give the 
formal law system social legitimacy.  
Implications for policy, programmes, and research 
The findings from this study indicate that while fear of legal sanctions is a key factor in motivating 
people to obey the law, this in itself might not have the desired effect of having people comply with 
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the law. Fear of legal sanctions can also cause people to develop mechanisms that help them to 
evade the law. In the case of FGM/C in Kenya, people in practising communities have developed 
mechanisms to enable them to evade the law, including underreporting FGM/C and carrying out the 
practice in secret. In light of this key finding, this study makes the specific recommendation that 
Kenya’s legal framework on the prohibition of FGM/C should be reviewed with the aim of making it 
more acceptable to practising communities, so that they can buy into the law and ultimately comply 
with it. Such a review of the law can be achieved in the following ways: 
• Research should be conducted to obtain the views of key stakeholders in practising 
communities (these include community leaders, religious leaders, women’s groups, youth 
groups and community-based organisations (CBOs) involved in the fight against FGM/C) on 
the issues within the legal framework prohibiting FGM/C in Kenya that require review and 
how such a review ought to be done; 
• Research should be conducted to obtain the views of law enforcement officials (including 
police officers, prosecutors, and judicial officers) on the issues within Kenya’s legal 
framework on the prohibition of FGM/C that make enforcement of the law difficult, and 
proposals as to how these might be addressed; 
• Proposals from the findings of the research activities suggested above should be made to 
relevant stakeholders and, in particular, the law reform commission which is mandated to 
review all laws in Kenya and to initiate processes of law reform.  
• Reform of Kenya’s anti-FGM/C law should take a bottom-up approach, and at all key stages 
communities should be involved, and their views taken on board through targeted public-
participation strategies. 
In addition to this specific recommendation, we make the following general recommendations: 
Programmatic implications 
Interventions aimed at ensuring implementation of the law: 
• Should not be done in silos but instead should target multiple groups, including government 
law enforcement officials, religious leaders, and community leaders. Creating a platform 
from where these different groups can have conversations and possibly learn from each 
other is key.  
• Should be differentiated by gender and ethnicity. 
• Should be tailor-made for specific communities—what works in one context might not 
necessarily work in another context. 
Policy implications 
• There is a need to use innovative approaches to address the internal failures of formal law 
so as to increase the legitimacy of the law and therefore inspire greater compliance with it 
by citizens. 
• There is a need to design enforcement and implementation programmes in a more 
participatory manner by taking a bottom-up approach. 
• There is a need to address the conflict between formal law on the one hand and religion and 
custom on the other hand to achieve social legitimacy within the formal criminal law.  
• There is a need for innovative approaches to implement, monitor, and evaluate policies and 
laws aimed at promoting the abandonment of FGM/C as the practice may be hidden and 
underreported.  
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Research implications 
• Our research suggests that FGM/C prevalence needs to be investigated using methods that 
use indirect means of questioning because of the tendency to underreport criminalised 
conduct that is rooted in traditions such as FGM/C.  
• Further research is necessary into how social legitimacy might be achieved for the formal 
criminal law that prohibits FGM/C, in order to inform policy interventions aimed at ensuring 
the implementation and enforcement of the law.  
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Introduction  
Background 
FGM/C is prohibited by law or decree in almost all practising countries (see Figure 1), and in 13 
of them it is a criminal violation (UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme 2015). In Kenya, the Children 
Act was passed in 2001, and it prohibited and criminalised FGM/C when performed on girls 
younger than the age of 18. Section 14 of the Children’s Act prohibits the exposure of children to 
harmful cultural practices, including FGM/C, while Section 20 criminalises any actions that 
breach the rights of children provided for under sections 5-19 of the Act, the penalty being a jail 
term of up to one year or a fine of 50,000 Kenyan Shillings (~US$500). In 2011, the Prohibition of 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Act was passed, imposing a total prohibition of FGM/C, and 
criminalising the practice when performed on any woman, regardless of her age. The Prohibition 
of FGM Act also criminalises the procuring of FGM/C, and it creates other associated offences, 
such as aiding and abetting in the procuring of FGM/C; use of one’s premises for FGM/C; being 
in possession of tools used for purposes of FGM/C; crossing the border out of Kenya to procure 
FGM/C in another country; failing to report to authorities when one is aware that FGM/C has 
been carried out; and the use of abusive or derogatory language to refer to a woman who has 
not undergone FGM/C or a man who marries a woman who has not undergone FGM/C. The 
Prohibition of FGM Act creates mandatory minimum sentences of three years imprisonment or a 
fine of 200,000 Kenyan Shillings for procuring FGM/C where the victim does not die and for all 
the associated offenses. Aggravated FGM/C, where the victim dies, attracts a sentence of life 
imprisonment. Because these are mandatory minimum sentences, it means the judicial officer 
has no discretion to impose a lighter sentence, but depending on the severity of the offence, the 
judicial officer may impose a stiffer sentence. In 2016, the Protection Against Domestic Violence 
Act was passed, recognising FGM/C or the threat of FGM/C as a form of domestic violence and 
further providing for issuance of protection orders for a victim of FGM/C or threatened FGM/C. 
There has been no analysis of how the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act is enforced, 
and whether any protection orders have been issued specifically with regard to cases of FGM/C. 
With regard to the Prohibition of FGM Act, 28 Too Many reports that since the passing of the Act 
in 2011, as in 2014, there were 71 cases prosecuted in court, with only 16 ending with 
convictions, 18 ended in acquittals, while four were withdrawn, and 33 were still pending in court 
(28TooMany 2018, 6). The UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM/C reports that as at 2016, 
75 cases were prosecuted, and only 10 resulted in convictions (UNFPA-UNICEF 2016, 47).  
Against this backdrop, a constitutional petition has been brought before the courts, challenging 
the constitutionality of the Act, to the extent that it interferes, inter alia, with the freedom of 
conscience, belief, and opinion set out under Article 32 of the Constitution and the right to 
participate in the cultural life of one’s choice, set out under Article 44 of the Constitution (Petition 
8 of 2017 available at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/154401). The petitioner, who is a 
medical doctor, argues that to the extent that the Prohibition of FGM Act interferes with women’s 
enjoyment of specific rights set out under the Bill of Rights, then the entire Act is unconstitutional 
and further that the Anti-FGM Board established under the Act is also unconstitutional. The 
matter is still in court.  
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Figure 1. Countries with nationally representative data on FGM/C in Africa and the Middle East, 
with laws against the practise 
 
Generally, and to date, criminalisation appears to have had limited effect. According to UNICEF 
(2013, 8): 
“Debate on the efficacy of legislation banning FGM/C has been largely overtaken by a 
growing consensus that laws should be one of a set of interventions by governments to 
support a social movement towards its elimination. A UNICEF report on legislative reform 
and FGM/C notes that such reform needs to take into account the degree of social 
support for the practice. In settings where segments of practising populations agree that 
girls and women should not undergo FGM/C, institutional frameworks can play an 
important role in supporting social change aimed at ending the practice…However, in 
communities with broad support for FGM/C, the challenge is to develop legislative reform 
strategies that complement efforts in the social sphere and contribute to collective 
abandonment of the practice.“ 
Laws have some positive effects, which probably depend on the way they are applied, and 
moreso where, for one reason or another, there is more social support for it.  
Why, therefore, is criminalisation so often suggested as a remedy? First, FGM/C involves 
caregivers acting on children to irreversibly reduce a valued human capacity (sexual functioning) 
in the absence of meaningful consent (Nussbaum 1999). We know that many people value 
sexual experience, but the worry about FGM/C is not that women should pursue such experience 
but rather that they should retain a free choice upon adulthood to do so or not (Nussbaum 1999). 
It is difficult for some people to understand or accept that those who practise FGM/C intend to 
help their daughters rather than to harm them. Second, many in the Western world assume the 
doctrine of legal centralism: that in most places most people obey most laws and, hence, that the 
law is usually the best way to bring about social change and to reduce social harms. This belief is 
not always true. The law is often not obeyed around the world, and law is often not the best way 
to bring about beneficial social change (Griffiths 1986). Third, people tend to think of themselves 
as motivated intrinsically, such as by moral considerations, and of others as having extrinsic 
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motivation such as by the threat of social pressure or legal punishment (summarised with respect 
to motivations to obey the law by Feldman (2011, 29–36). For example, in Colombia, the 
nongovernmental organisation (NGO), Corpovisionarios, conducts a standard survey intended to 
measure the moral, social, and legal reasons people have for being good citizens and complying 
with just law. The modal responses in Colombia are that “I obey the law for moral reasons, but 
others obey the law to avoid legal penalties” (Guillot 2012). Guillot suggests that people might 
mistakenly demand that the state apply harsh legal penalties, when, in fact, moral and social 
appeals would be more effective in the community. Similarly, outsiders’ beliefs that those who do 
FGM/C would be more deterred by threats of punishment than by moral deliberations and social 
mobilisations could be mistaken.  
The aim of this study therefore is to understand how better to use criminalisation to promote the 
abandonment of FGM/C, because a common policy response to FGM/C is to call for enactment 
and enforcement of a criminal law to prohibit the practice. The study is unique in several ways: 
first, it highlights a variety of relevant literature on the question of compliance with law regulating 
social practices in lower-income countries; secondly, it proceeds to directly find out from citizens 
in Kenya why they obey or disobey laws; and it studies the legal effect locally, by means of list 
experiments designed to reduce response bias. It provides an initial assessment of the effect of 
legal salience on the self-report data strongly relied upon for policy formation; it adds new 
information on the degree of compliance by methods that are independent of population and 
health surveys; it investigates why people comply or not to better design legal implementation. 
Theoretical underpinnings 
Why people obey the law 
To explain variability in the effectiveness of criminal law, we first need to understand and 
investigate the reasons people have for obeying it. People are motivated to obey the law by 
these reasons (synthesised from Friedman 2016, Hart 1961, Kahan 1997, Mackie 2017, 
McAdams 2015, Tyler 1990):  
• Moral: 
o Personal agreement: following specific laws, believing they are morally right 
o Legitimacy: believing that one owes general obedience to the law 
• Procedural: believing that authorities apply the law fairly to all 
• Social:  
o Descriptive norm: Obeying/disobeying because others obey/disobey (including social 
proof and coordination) 
o Injunctive norm: Shame among peers for disobeying the law, or pride for obeying 
• Punitive:  
o Fear of government punishment  
o Or, more rarely, hope of government reward 
• Religious 
o We hypothesise that religious motivations take the form of moral agreement, or social 
approval by the religious community, or fear of punishment by the religious 
community. 
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It is also useful to distinguish between obedience of specific laws, and general obedience to the 
law. Obedience to many specific laws converges on general obedience, and a disposition to 
general obedience results in obedience to many specific laws. In all societies, there are specific 
laws that most people do not obey; even in societies of high general obedience. For example, 
millions of youth pirate and exchange music files in violation of copyright law.  
Why might criminalisation be ineffective? 
To understand legal obedience and disobedience, we need to appreciate how the operation of 
criminal law varies in different political and social contexts. There are five main reasons why 
effectiveness of criminalisation of FGM/C may be limited in practising countries.  
First, because of the colonial legacy of underdevelopment, states in sub-Saharan Africa tend to 
lack the state capacity to strongly enforce laws that conflict with cultural norms, such as laws that 
prohibit FGM/C (Tamanaha 2008). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) offer a short 
definition: “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in, 
and abide by, the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” For FGM/C, the 
state’s role in fairly and effectively enacting, applying, and enforcing the law is especially 
important. Weakness of state capacity diminishes two of the moral reasons for complying with 
the law: legitimacy of the state’s commands and its procedural fairness in enforcing them.  
Second, in high-income countries, societies tend towards legal centralism and in low- and 
middle-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, they tend to legal pluralism (multiple 
legal authorities). In colonial or postcolonial settings, it is quite usual for there to be formal law 
promulgated by the colonial power or its state successor alongside customary law and/or Islamic 
law for each of the many groups in that state.  
What makes this pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are multiple 
uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there is diversity 
amongst them. They may make competing claims of authority; they may impose 
conflicting demands or norms; they may have different styles and orientations. This 
potential conflict can generate uncertainty or jeopardy for individuals and groups in 
society, who cannot be sure in advance which legal regime will be applied to their 
situation. (Tamanaha 2008, 375)  
As the European states centralised power and built state capacity, formal law over time came to 
displace previous reliance on custom. As those same states pursued imperial conquest, they 
imposed an alien formal law on their colonies, often relying on indirect rule that recognised the 
customary laws of the indigenous peoples. The dual legalism naturally persisted after colonies 
gained independence. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
estimates that in many low- and middle-income countries, 80% of cases are settled within 
traditional or customary legal systems, which Tamanaha, Sage, and Woolcock (2012) call an 
understatement. De Herdt and de Sardan (2015) collected detailed empirical investigations of 
“real governance and practical norms in sub-Saharan Africa.” They portray how people navigate 
through multiple authorities, for example, forest inspectors balancing among bureaucratic, audit, 
professional, political, ethnic, patron–client, colleague, and other accountabilities (Blundo 2015). 
The setting is not a lack of authority, but multiple, conflicting authorities. Similarly, FGM/C as a 
traditional practice may be supported under custom but outlawed under formal state law. People 
may opt to obey custom, which supports FGM/C, and disobey the formal law which prohibits 
FGM/C. Change agents should recognise the fact of legal pluralism where it exists. Customary 
law can harm women’s rights and interests, as can formal law. Harmonisation of authorities on 
morally justified ends is the appropriate response.  
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According to Sage and Woolcock (2012), development practitioners are presently coming to 
terms with legal pluralism as a development issue. Another edited volume, by the Harvard 
Human Rights Program, The International Rule of Law Movement: A Crisis of Legitimacy and the 
Way Forward (Marshall 2014) describes a general failure of the rule-of-law programmes in post-
conflict and fragile states; urges more attention to conditions of legal pluralism, and strong 
incorporation of moral, social, and political considerations in programme design. Several recent 
volumes consider the realisation of human rights in contexts of legal pluralism (Corradi, Brems, 
and Goodale 2017; Provost and Sheppard 2013), and gender justice and legal pluralism (Sieder 
and McNeish 2013, Kerrigan et al. 2012).  
Third, the threat of punishment does not necessitate compliance. Indeed, a longstanding 
research programme in criminology began from the premise that, “Legal punishment either 
reduces, increases, or has no effect on future crimes, depending on the type of offenders, 
offenses, social settings, and levels of analysis” (Sherman 1993). A similar maxim applies in the 
international arena. Political scientists have studied whether countries’ ratification of human 
rights treaties improve respect for human rights. The results are dismaying. For example, 
Neumayer (2005) found that among countries that ratify human rights treaties, improvements in 
human rights tended to be among countries that were already democratic or had more NGOs in 
their society. In autocratic regimes with weak civil society, ratification had no effect on human 
rights compliance or even made things worse. Hathaway (2007), studying 160 countries over 
several decades, found that more authoritarian states are not any less likely to ratify human 
rights treaties than democratic states, because authoritarian states do not expect to comply with 
the human rights treaties they ratify. More democratic states are more reluctant to ratify human 
rights treaties if they have a poor rights record, because ratification would compel them to comply 
with treaty requirements. Hafner-Burton, Victor, and Lupu (2012, 80), in a nuanced summary 
review of the literature observes that, “there is a troubling and recurrent finding that participation 
in some treaties correlates with worse human rights behaviour.” Given such findings, it is not 
clear whether accumulating enactments of criminal laws of FGM/C across practising countries 
indicates or predicts significant progress in abandonment of the practice.  
Shell-Duncan et al. (2012, 1), in their study of criminalisation of FGM/C in Senegal found that,  
“Among supporters of FGC [female genital cutting], legal norms ran counter to social 
norms, and did little to deter the practice, and in some instances incited reactance or 
drove the practice underground. Conversely, where FGC was being contested, legislation 
served to strengthen the stance of those contemplating or favouring abandonment. We 
conclude that legislation can complement other reform strategies by creating an ‘enabling 
environment‘ that supports those who have or wish to abandon FGC.”  
Ethiopia has a strong criminal law against FGM/C that is widely publicised. A Young Lives 
ethnographic study (Boyden, Pankhurst, and Tafere 2013), constructed from interviews 
conducted in 2007, 2008, and 2011 with 25 youth from five communities as well as their peers, 
caregivers, and community representatives, presents evidence that among many of their 
respondents, the practice of FGM/C had gone underground and possibly become stronger in 
reaction to the imposition of the law. Girls who had opposed the practice changed as they 
approached the age of marriage because of peer pressure from older girls, and some girls 
demanded and organised together for FGM/C on their own, without their parents’ knowledge, 
which also shields parents from prosecution. The authors conclude, “that interventions to 
promote changes in practices that do not consider the underlying logics and potential unintended 
consequences for those affected are unlikely to achieve their aims and may engender resistance 
and result in adverse outcomes” (p. 42).  
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Fourth, empirical literature on criminal deterrence repeatedly shows that moral and social 
reasons contribute strongly to compliance. Tyler’s (1990, 45) pioneering Chicago study on legal 
obedience showed that self-reported legal compliance is correlated with morality (r=0.42), peer 
disapproval (0.34), and certainty of punishment (0.28). A summary review of empirical studies 
(Nagin and Pogarsky 2001, 869) states that, “a belief that illicit conduct is wrong, and the fear of 
disapproval, embarrassment or social stigma discourages offending behaviour.” Further, several 
studies investigating the relative strength of sanction forms find “the conforming influence of 
extra-legal [moral and social] sanctions to be far greater than that from legal sanctions” (Nagin 
and Pogarsky 2001, 869). A meta-analysis of empirical studies by Pratt et al. (2006) concludes 
that the effect sizes of variables having to do with the certainty and severity of legal punishment 
are “modest to negligible” (p. 383), and that variables related to the threat of force of extra-legal 
sanctions such as moral conscience or social disapproval are “among the most robust predictors 
of deterrence” (p. 385). A review of deterrence theory by a leading criminologist (Paternoster 
2010) concludes, in part, that:  
The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that there is a marginal deterrent effect 
for legal sanctions, but…it is very difficult to state with any precision how strong a 
deterrent effect the criminal justice system provides…. There is greater confidence that 
non-legal factors are more effective in securing compliance than legal threats. (p. 765) 
The Presidential Address of criminological theorist Agnew (2014) to the American Society of 
Criminology reviews literature on a variety of moral and social motivations and their likely 
contributions to legal compliance. Additionally, laws themselves are held in place not only by 
moral and penal motives but, crucially, by social norms of general or specific legal obedience—
the approval of relevant others for compliance and their disapproval for defiance, and simply 
whether or not others obey. In the absence of a social norm of legal obedience, popular 
compliance would be low. Sometimes the lack of the social norm may be the product of popular 
opposition or indifference to the content of a particular law; sometimes general legal 
disobedience can exist among a minority of “legal nihilists” who pride themselves on defiance. 
Also, absence of a social norm of obedience to formal law may be the product of a social norm of 
obedience to conflicting customary law.  
One response to these considerations is Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus’s doctrine, and civic 
practice, of the harmonisation of moral, social, and legal norms (Table 1) (Mackie 2017, Mockus 
2002).  Thus, the use of legal regulation that provides for the prohibition of FGM/C may not, in 
and of itself, act to deter people from practising FGM/C. Ideally, there ought to be a social norm 
on the obedience of the law that prohibits FGM/C. This is so, because there already exists a 
social norm that supports the practice of FGM/C. Enacting a law that prohibits FGM/C does not 
automatically lead to the formation of a social norm that requires obedience to that law. Policy 
should rely first on moral regulation, next on social regulation and, only as a last resort on legal 
regulation, and all three systems of regulation should be in harmony with one another. In 
contexts of legal pluralism, Mockus’s idea should be supplemented to include harmonisation of 
formal and customary laws.   
Table 1. Harmonisation of three regulatory systems.  
 Legal norms Moral norms Social norms 
Positive reasons Respect for the law Good conscience Esteem  
acceptance 
Negative reasons Legal penalties Bad conscience Disesteem rejection 
A typical emotion in a violator Fear Guilt Shame 
Source: Adapted by Mackie (2017) from Mockus (2002) 
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Fifth, the criminal law is designed to regulate harmful deviance at the margins of social 
consensus (Mackie 2017). Dowry murder, for example, is deviation from an accepted norm, its 
harmful consequences are intended, a few specific individuals are culpable, and the remedy is 
backward-looking: punishment of guilty individuals. Dowry itself can also be harmful: it can 
incentivise neglect of the health and education of girls, even leading to female feticide and 
infanticide in contexts where the daughter’s family must pay a groom’s family to take the 
daughter and because returns from the family’s investment in the daughter accrue to the groom’s 
family. However, dowry is compliance with an accepted norm; its harmful consequences are 
indirect and often unintended; there is a shared responsibility among many for its continuation, 
and the remedy is forward-looking: coordinated abandonment.  
Dowry is criminalised, without effect, in India (Mackie 2017). Why? Its prevalence in rural India 
from 1960 to 1995 was about 93%. The law targets a large section of the population and would 
require sanctions to be applied against this very large section of the population—a near 
impossibility. Thus, law enforcers do not enforce. Police and prosecutors have limited resources 
and enforcement discretion: they will pursue crimes that enforcers and the local community most 
want to be punished. Judges and juries are reluctant to punish when crimes they think are worse 
are punished less or not at all. If there is outside pressure, the law will be enforced against the 
weakest sectors in society, and unfair enforcement will reduce general legal obedience in that 
population. Citizens do not obey because they expect the law to approximate popular views, and 
the general and particular legitimacy of the law is undermined. And why obey, if others do not?  
Aldashev et al. (2012) model a regime with formal law and customary law where pro-poor legal 
reforms cause the conflicting custom to shift towards the change intended by the legislator. A 
moderate law can increase the bargaining power of a local person governed by customary law 
who can credibly threaten to move a dispute to the formal, legal arena, thereby obtaining a local 
settlement more in her favour. The law acts as a magnet moving custom in its direction. An 
extreme law, that most expect not to be enforceable, however, has no such magnet effect. The 
model is illustrated by empirical research in Ghana: a more moderate law bestowing inheritance 
rights on women and children was more effective than the previous extreme law and drew 
customary practice more towards the content of the moderate law. Elsewhere, Platteau (2010) 
illustrates the model with further examples from sub-Saharan Africa, both of extreme laws that 
lack effect and more moderate laws that do have the magnet effect their model predicts. Gabon 
and Senegal, for example, former French colonies, banned the practice of polygyny, with little 
effect. Each shifted to a more moderate—and effective—regime of monogamy or polygyny as a 
choice in the initial marriage contract.  
An appropriate and important approach to understanding the lack of compliance with laws such 
as FGM/C is at the level of international law, state compliance with international law, and a 
state’s ability and will to enforce the law. Middelburg (2016) is the exemplary work in this line, 
concluding with a case study of the law in Senegal. We shall not focus on this level of causation, 
for two reasons. First, existing investigations and explanations of the lack of compliance focus on 
state compliance with international law, but there have been no studies as to why citizens would 
obey or disobey FGM/C law. We want to avoid duplication of past work and produce a novel 
study that opens a new line of work that others can take further.  
Second, where states comply with international law, and in states’ ability and will to enforce the 
law, such as in the United Kingdom or France, it is not clear how effective prohibition of FGM/C 
has been. If arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment for violation cause deterrence, there 
have been few such actions (Berer 2015) in these countries. In the United Kingdom, there has 
only been one successful prosecution of an FGM/C case, which happened in 2019, yet the law 
criminalising FGM/C in the UK has been in force since 1985 (Feikert-Ahalt 2019). Questions to 
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investigate in these most favourable conditions include whether the nature of FGM/C is such that 
it is difficult to identify violations, or whether, even in these countries, the nature of FGM/C is 
such to make personnel in the criminal justice system reluctant to respond to the problem with 
penal methods.  
Objectives and research questions 
To address the gaps in our knowledge of why people obey or disobey the law on FGM/C, we 
conducted a study in Kenya (as part of a larger multi-country study on FGM/C and legal 
obedience). The aims of the study were to:  
• measure the extent to which people obey the law on FGM/C.  
• investigate the reasons and causes that motivate people born into a tradition of FGM/C to 
obey or not to obey a law prohibiting FGM/C. 
o To investigate the moral, social, and punitive reasons that influence people to obey 
rules of conduct, the law in general, and, in particular, FGM/C law.  
o To investigate the reasons why people obey laws in general, and the FGM/C law in 
particular, by conducting local qualitative and quantitative studies.  
o To investigate how the content of the law, the design of its implementation, and the 
actual administration of its implementation affects compliance with FGM/C law. 
• establish the legal, policy, and programme responses, across varying contexts, that would 
most effectively reduce the practice of FGM/C. 
Research questions 
• To what extent do people obey laws prohibiting them to practise FGM/C?  
• Among people born into a tradition of FGM/C, what are the reasons and causes that 
motivate them to obey or not obey a law prohibiting FGM/C? 
o What are the moral, social, and punitive reasons that influence people to obey 
rules of conduct, the law in general, and in particular FGM/C law? 
o What other reasons influence the choice to cut or not?  
o How does the design and administration of legal implementation affect people’s 
choice to obey the law?  
• Given the findings, what legal, policy, and programme responses, across varying 
contexts, would most effectively reduce the practice of FGM/C?  
Methods 
Study design 
We conducted an exploratory mixed-methods study. First, we conducted desk reviews of the 
enactment and implementation of anti-FGM/C law in Kenya. Second, we analysed existing 
national datasets to assess changes in reported FGM/C prevalence in the country during 
different time periods when there existed no law, a moderate law, and a strong law in the 
country. This analysis helped in formulating an initial assessment of the relationship between the 
enactment of a law prohibiting FGM/C and reported FGM/C prevalence. Third, to assess the 
impact of the design and administration of legal implementation on the choice to obey the law, 
we conducted key informant interviews (KIIs) with community gatekeepers, government workers 
such as health officials and teachers, and law enforcement officials, such as magistrates. We 
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also conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with adult men and women from selected 
communities to assess the reasons that influence the choice to cut or not to cut. Finally, in line 
with the theoretical framework, we designed and administered a quantitative survey tool that was 
informed by the qualitative data to investigate the moral, social, punitive and religious motivations 
people have for obeying the law.  
Study site 
Kenya has a population of 48 million; in 2014 the prevalence of FGM/C among women aged 15–
49 years was 21% (KNBS and ICF Macro 2015). Unlike most practising countries, FGM/C in 
Kenya has been in steady decline since the 1960s, according to inferences from DHS data 
(Engelsma, Mackie, and Merrell 2020). President Jomo Kenyatta had made an issue of the 
cultural value of FGM/C for the Kikuyu during the independence struggle and the government did 
not act on the issue in his era (today, incidence of FGM/C among the Kikuyu is near zero [see 
Figure 2, which shows that the prevalence of FGM/C among Kikuyu girls aged 15–19 years is 
nearly zero]). President Daniel arap Moi issued two decrees banning the practice and forbidding 
it in government-controlled health facilities. A National Plan of Action was launched in 1999, 
followed in 2001 by a criminal law that prohibited FGM/C for girls younger than 18 years. Section 
14 of that Act declared that “no person shall subject a child to female circumcision,” and Section 
20 imposed criminal penalties on any person who wilfully or by culpable negligence violates the 
child’s right not to be cut. Reportedly, there was little enforcement and little effect. In 2011, a 
stronger law was enacted, applying to all ages, and with stronger penalties. It also imposed 
penalties on those who aid, abet, counsel, or procure another person to perform FGM/C, or 
anyone who fails to report an act of cutting to law enforcement. Interestingly, it penalises the 
stigmatisation of women who have not undergone FGM/C, in order to undermine it as a social 
norm. Kenya has a strong coordinating body, a strong national action plan, a state budget for 
FGM/C, and has built response-capacity within the criminal justice system and among 
community leaders. A richer account of the law in Kenya can be found in Shell-Duncan, Gathara, 
and Moore (2017, 9–11).  
Figure 2. Prevalence of FGM/C across age cohorts by ethnicity, KDHS 2014 
 
Source: Adapted from Shell-Duncan, Gathara, and Moore (2017) 
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The study was conducted in southwest and northeast Kenya (Figure 3). In selecting the sites, we 
primarily considered the communities living in the chosen sites, the prevalence of FGM/C among 
these communities, as well as security concerns. Nationally, FGM/C is prevalent among the Kisii, 
the Maasai, and the Somali ethnic groups (Figure 2) and we sought to include participants from 
these communities.  
Figure 3. Map of Kenya’s counties showing study sites 
 
 
In southwestern Kenya, FGM/C prevalence is high and barely declining in Kisii County.  It is high 
but recently declining in Narok County, which forms the southern boundary of Kisii County, home 
mostly to people from the Kisii ethnic group. Narok is home primarily to the Maasai; the Kisii; the 
Kipsigis, who are abandoning FGM/C; the Kikuyu, who have mostly abandoned the practise; and 
two noncutting groups. Qualitative and quantitative data-gathering activities were conducted in 
Ogembo subcounty in Kisii County; Kilgoris in Trans Mara West subcounty in Narok County and 
Emurua Dikiir in Trans Mara East sub-county, also in Narok County.  
The prevalence of FGM/C is high in northeast Kenya because of the large population of Somalis 
among whom the practise is nearly universal. Because of security concerns in much of the 
northeast, the study was conducted in Isiolo County where there are many cutting groups 
including the Somali, Borana and the Samburu. To the northwest of Isiolo County lies Samburu 
County, an area of recent decline of FGM/C and home to cutting, abandoning, and noncutting 
groups. To the west of Isiolo is Laikipia County, an area of more prolonged decline, and home to 
a variety of cutting, abandoning, and non-cutting groups, among them, the Somali, the Samburu, 
the Meru, and the Kikuyu. This contiguous area lies to the north of Mount Kenya, and a subset of 
it was one of our study sites. In this study site, the qualitative data-gathering activities were 
conducted in Isiolo county in the following villages: Ngaremara village, mainly inhabited by the 
Turkana community; Kipsing village mainly inhabited by the Samburu community; and Burat 
village, mainly inhabited by the Somali community. The quantitative data gathering was 
conducted in Bula Pesa which is inhabited by the Somali; Burat which is inhabited by the Borana; 
and Kipsing which is inhabited by the Samburu.  
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Participants 
In the qualitative study, we interviewed men and women from the following ethnic groups: Kisii, 
Maasai, Kipsigis, Somali, Samburu, and Turkana. The Turkana are a non-practising community 
who neighbour practising communities. Their inclusion was important for the purpose of 
understanding cross-ethnic influences. In the quantitative study, we only included men and 
women from communities that traditionally practise FGM/C so the non-practising Turkana were 
replaced by the Borana, who are a practising community.  
Key informants were purposively selected based on their knowledge and experiences with 
compliance with moral, social, and legal rules in the community. To be eligible to participate in 
the KII, participants must reside in the study sites and they had to fall within any of the following 
categories: community gatekeepers, religious leaders, law enforcement officials, health workers, 
or teachers. In total, 60 key informant interviews were conducted, with 30 from each of our study 
sites. All key informants were aged 18 years or older.  
Four FGDs were held in each community that was studied, giving us a total of 24 FGDs. In each 
community we held separate discussions with a group of younger men (aged 18–34 years), a 
group of older men (35 years and older), a group of younger women (aged 18–34 years), and a 
group of older women (35 years and older). Each focus group consisted of between 6–8 persons.  
A total of 1200 participants (50% male) were surveyed. Socio-demographic characteristics of the 
survey respondents are summarised in Table 2. A total of six ethnic communities were targeted 
for interviews, with 203 respondents from Borana, 202 from Kipsigis, 194 from Kisii, 198 from 
Maasai, 198 from Samburu, and 197 from Somali communities. There were eight other 
respondents who were sampled and interviewed but belonged to other ethnicities. They were 
interviewed because they had lived in those communities long enough to adapt and understood 
the cultures and traditions of the people they were living among. Some were married to someone 
from one of the targeted groups. Data from these participants are not included in analyses 
looking at associations by ethnicity (n=1192).  
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of survey respondents (N=1200) 
  Female 
N (%) 
Male 
N (%) 
Total 
N (%) 
Age (median IQR) 33 (25, 45) 37 (28, 54) 35 (26, 50) 
Ethnicity  
Borana  103 (17.2) 100 (16.7) 203 (16.9) 
Kipsigis 102 (17.0) 100 (16.7) 202 (16.8) 
Kisii 95 (15.8) 99 (16.5) 194 (16.2) 
Maasai 98 (16.3) 100 (16.7) 198 (16.5) 
Samburu 98 (16.3) 100 (16.7) 198 (16.5) 
Somali 97 (16.2) 100 (16.7) 197 (16.4) 
Other 7 (1.2) 1 (0.2) 8 (0.7) 
Marital status  
Never married 42 (7.0) 120 (20.0) 162 (13.5) 
Ever married 558 (93.0) 480 (80.0) 1038 (86.5) 
Lives in same household with own parents  54 (9.0) 141 (23.5) 195 (16.3) 
Lives in same household with spouse’s parents  66 (11.8) 38 (7.9) 104 (10.2) 
Who makes decisions about money?  
You 100 (16.7) 356 (59.3) 456 (38.0) 
Your spouse 186 (31.0) 11 (1.8) 197 (16.4) 
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  Female 
N (%) 
Male 
N (%) 
Total 
N (%) 
You and your spouse equally 260 (43.3) 107 (17.8) 367 (30.6) 
Your parents 39 (6.5) 101 (16.8) 140 (11.7) 
Your spouse’s parents 4 (0.7) 1 (0.2) 5 (0.4) 
Someone else 11 (1.8) 24 (4.0) 35 (2.9) 
Number of children  
None 47 (7.8) 128 (21.3) 175 (14.6) 
1–3 219 (36.5) 178 (29.7) 397 (33.1) 
4–8 288 (48.0) 247 (41.2) 535 (44.6) 
9 or more 46 (7.7) 46 (7.7) 92 (7.7) 
Don’t Know 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.1) 
Duration of stay in the community  
< 1 year 15 (2.5) 6 (1.0) 21 (1.8) 
1–5 years 62 (10.3) 23 (3.8) 85 (7.1) 
> 5 years 266 (44.3) 145 (24.2) 411 (34.3) 
Since birth 257 (42.8) 426 (71.0) 683 (56.9) 
Religion  
Islam 200 (33.3) 201 (33.5) 401 (33.4) 
Christianity 389 (64.8) 319 (53.2) 708 (59.0) 
Traditional 0 (0.0) 12 (2.0) 12 (1.0) 
Don’t practise any religion 11 (1.8) 62 (10.3) 73 (6.1) 
Don’t know 0 (0.0) 6 (1.0) 6 (0.5) 
 
The median age of the female respondents was 33 (IQR: 25–45) and male 37 (IQR: 28–54). 
Ninety-three percent and 80% of the female and male respondents respectively were married; 
and among those who were married 9% of females and 24% of males lived in the same house 
with their parents. A greater proportion of men (59%) compared to women (17%) reported that 
they made decisions themselves. Seventy-one percent of the male and 43% of the female 
respondents had lived in the village where they were interviewed since they were born (they had 
not moved in from another place) whereas 44% of the female respondents had lived there for at 
least 5 years. 
Instruments  
Key informant interview (KII) guide 
We used a semi-structured guide for the KIIs to allow participants to provide as much information 
as they felt was relevant. The guide included hypothetical scenarios or vignettes, given the 
sensitivity of the subject. One scenario on early and forced marriage was included to allow us to 
draw some comparisons between how people generally respond to FGM/C and a similar activity. 
To ensure that the guide was appropriate for use in different cultural contexts, we reviewed the 
guide with research assistants who were recruited from the study communities. The guide was 
pre-tested in the field prior to data collection. 
Focus group discussion (FGD) guide 
We used a semi-structured guide for the FGDs. The guide included vignettes to probe 
particularly sensitive topics. It also included scenarios to allow us to draw comparisons between 
how individuals and communities respond to FGM/C and other similar (early marriage) and dis-
similar activities (petty theft and a fight between two women in the marketplace). For each 
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community studied, we worked with research assistants from the targeted communities to tailor 
the vignettes to ensure local relevance. Thus, for instance, in the scenario on petty theft we 
asked about the theft of crops such as bananas for the Kisii, while for pastoral communities, we 
asked about the theft of small animals such as kids or lambs. Further, for the female FGDs, the 
names used in the stories were female names, and male names used for the male FGDs. In all 
substantive aspects, the FGD guide remained standard across all the communities. The guide 
was pre-tested in the field prior to data collection.  
Quantitative survey questionnaire 
The quantitative survey questionnaire was developed to include questions that would assess the 
motivations people have for obeying the law. General questions about law were included, and 
these were followed by questions that were specific to FGM/C law. The questionnaire also 
contained activities that could be used to draw comparisons between FGM/C and other activities 
that are also criminalised. The questionnaire thus included questions on riding a motorbike 
without a helmet and paying a bribe to the police. Vignettes were also included in the 
questionnaire, to allow for further comparisons between people’s responses to anti-FGM/C law 
on the one hand and law that criminalises riding a motorbike without a helmet and the paying of 
bribes to police.  
To estimate the proportion of people who planned to continue the practice of FGM/C, we 
embedded a list experiment (unmatched count technique) in the quantitative survey 
questionnaire. The unmatched count technique (Dalton, Wimbush, and Daily 1994) is designed 
in a manner such that it is clear to the respondent that no one can detect whether s/he committed 
the sensitive act being investigated. Unmatched count requires two large random samples of the 
population. Respondents in the control sample are presented, for example, with four benign or 
neutral activities and asked whether they have engaged in them anytime in some fixed period. 
They are to count the number of activities they did at least once and report the total, but to say 
nothing more. Respondents in the treatment sample are presented with those first four activities 
plus, say, cutting of girls by the family, and asked to count the number of activities they did at 
least once and report the total. The two random samples are compared and the number of 
people doing FGM/C can be deduced by subtracting the number of yes answers in the control 
condition from the number of yes answers in the treatment condition, and there is no way that 
anyone can identify any individual who performed the sensitive action. Unmatched count 
consistently yields higher reports of sensitive activity than self-report (Gibson et al. 2018). In this 
study, from a sample of 1200, the sample was randomly divided in such a way that 600 
respondents received the five items (without the sensitive question) and the other sample 
received six items (with an extra sensitive item). Randomisation on who received the control 
items and who received the treatment items was done prior to data collection to reduce selection 
bias. Those who were randomised in the control group were asked to give the number of 
activities they planned to carry out in future from the five activities read to them, while those in 
the treatment group were asked the same but from the six activities read to them, which included 
the sensitive activity: circumcise my daughter or granddaughter. The list of activities read for the 
individuals randomly assigned to the control group include: visiting a sick relative, riding on a 
motorbike without a helmet, paying the police a bribe to avoid punishment, accuse a family 
member of witchcraft, celebrating a religious feast. We estimated the proportion of people 
intending to practise FGM/C by computing the difference in the total counts between the 
treatment group and the control group, expressed as a fraction of the total number of individuals 
in the treatment group.   
To better understand the impact of custom on criminal law in the context of legal plurality, we 
also embedded an endorsement experiment within the survey questionnaire to help determine 
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the institutions that generally tend to influence individuals within communities in making choices 
concerning the abandonment of FGM/C. Endorsement is an experiment embedded in a larger 
survey instrument where the sample is randomly divided into smaller subsamples who are asked 
the same question but with an altered entity supporting or presenting the programme to assess 
how responses differ. The key assumption in endorsement experiments is that the larger survey 
sample is large enough so that subsamples are representative of the population. To illustrate 
with one application in Malawi, a persuasive message on delay of early female marriage was 
presented either on its own, by a respected female authority, a respected male authority, or a 
parliamentarian (Muriaas et al. 2017). Respondents’ approval of the statement from the female 
authority was most effective, and from either of the other two authorities’ approval was less than 
the control presentation. We applied the endorsement experiment to assess the persuasiveness 
of government, traditional, and religious institutions in promoting abandonment. Specifically, the 
larger sample of 1200 was randomly subdivided into four subsamples; control, traditional, 
government, and religious. The control group was asked “As you may be aware, recently a new 
programme was started to educate parents about female genital mutilation/cutting and to 
convince them not to cut their daughters. Do you support or oppose this programme?”.  The 
remaining groups were told that the programme is supported by the community elders (traditional 
sub-sample), the Kenyan government (government subsample), and religious leaders (religious 
group). 
Procedures  
Entry into the community was facilitated by the County Commissioners and local area chiefs in 
the study areas. The local-area chiefs also worked with the research team to identify potential 
participants for the KIIs and FGDs. The research assistants then followed up with potential 
participants for the KIIs to set dates and times for the interviews. All interviews were conducted 
between 8:00am–6:00pm, either in the informant’s place of work or in any other location within 
the study site as per the informant’s preference. Focus group discussions were held in venues 
identified with the help of field guides, between 8:00am–6:00pm. We avoided the market days as 
well as religious days, to ensure that we had the required number of participants for the FGDs. 
All interviews and discussions were audio recorded with written permission from the participants. 
We selected quantitative survey participants using systematic random sampling, where villages 
were systematically selected, but individuals were randomly selected. The research assistants, 
working in teams of four, used two field guides to gain access into the villages inhabited by the 
target communities. Once in the villages, the research assistants worked in pairs to select and 
interview participants. In each homestead, which was a group of houses clustered together and 
inhabited mainly by members of the same extended family, research assistants visited every 
household and used programmed tablets to randomly select one male participant and one 
female participant, both older than 18 years, for the interview. The interviews in each household 
were done at the same time, but separately, before moving on to the next household. 
Quantitative data were collected electronically using Open Data Kit (ODK) on tablets running the 
Android operating system and installed with ODK Collect. The survey instrument was 
programmed onto tablets and field teams trained on how to use it to administer the 
questionnaire. A one-day pilot field test was done to test the tool and logistics of community 
entry. 
All the research assistants were recruited from the local communities where they worked, were 
conversant with the local customs and language, and all had previous research experience. They 
were all duly trained on the study procedures and on research ethics prior to data collection.  
 15 
Data analysis 
Qualitative data audio recordings were transcribed in order to allow for their analysis. A coding 
framework was developed using key themes derived from the KII and FGD guides. These key 
themes are set out under the subheadings in the results section of this report. Using this thematic 
framework, a code book was then created on NVivo 12 software. The transcripts were then 
imported onto NVivo and the responses were coded to the relevant nodes by two qualitative data 
analysts.  
Quantitative data were analysed in STATA version 14.1, and results presented in tables and 
graphs. Categorical variables were analysed through descriptive frequency distributions and two-
way cross tabulations. In cases where expected value in the cell was less than 5, we used 
Fisher’s Exact tests. Where necessary, both the numbers and proportions are presented, 
otherwise only percentages are presented. Numerically collected variables were summarised 
using median as a measure of central tendency and interquartile range (IQR) as a measure of 
variability for rather skewed variables, or mean and standard deviation as a measure of central 
tendency and variability, respectively, for approximately normally distributed variables. As is 
standard practice with experiments, a two-sample t-test was done to compare the means of the 
control and treatment groups to determine whether they are statistically different at a 5% level of 
statistical significance. Prevalence was estimated by subtracting the total number of activities 
given by the respondents in the control group from the total number of activities given by the 
respondents in the treatment group and expressed as a fraction of the number of individuals in 
the treatment group. 
Ethical considerations 
Ethics approval was received from the Population Council Institutional Review Board and from 
AMREF Health Africa. Approval to conduct the study was also received from the National 
Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). In Kisii and Narok County, 
additional approvals were obtained from the County Director of Education. County 
Commissioners in Isiolo, Kisii, and Narok, as well as the Deputy County Commissioners in Trans 
Mara West and Trans Mara East subcounties were informed about the study.  
Research assistants were trained on ethical principles in research and were required to adhere 
to safety procedures during the collection of data given the security risk in some of the data sites. 
All researchers and research assistants completed the online FHI 360 Research Ethics Training 
Curriculum.  
All interviews and discussions were conducted in private. All participants provided signed 
informed consent. Research assistants submitted all the data and the consent forms to their 
team leaders at the end of each day of data collection, and the team leaders were then required 
to transmit the data to the researchers immediately for storage in password-protected databases. 
All datasets and transcripts are anonymised. 
Results 
This section presents the results of the study under the following broad themes: types of disputes 
and conflict-resolution mechanisms; knowledge about legality/illegality of FGM/C; sources of 
information on formal and customary law; the list experiment; prevalence estimation from the list 
experiment; compliance motivations; religious and traditional obligations regarding FGM/C, 
knowledge of FGM/C practice as compared with other criminalised conduct, engendered 
knowledge of FGM/C, reasons for the practice of FGM/C; continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C, 
awareness of social cost of FGM/C, and the endorsement experiment. In the FGM/C knowledge 
and practice sections we compare FGM/C with other criminalised activities like riding a motorbike 
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without a helmet and paying police a bribe to avoid punishment to demonstrate the hypothesis 
that people tend to underreport FGM/C because FGM/C is rooted in the community customs 
while the other two are not. 
Types of disputes and conflict-resolution mechanisms 
The legitimacy of formal laws may be reflected in people’s preferred avenues for resolution of 
common disputes. We therefore carried out an assessment of common disputes in the 
communities studied, and how these disputes are resolved. Respondents were asked what the 
most common disputes were in their communities. Figure 4 shows the proportions as reported by 
the respondents disaggregated by gender. The most common disputes reported by both male 
and female respondents were disputes over land (41%) and domestic disputes (25%). A greater 
proportion of males (33%) than females (17%) reported domestic disputes. Other disputes 
revolved around livestock and cattle rustling, alcoholism and drug abuse, gossiping, insecurity, 
and the lack of or inadequate access to development resources like water and facilities like 
hospitals because of poor roads.  
Figure 4. Common disputes among FGM/C-practising communities by gender 
 
Within ethnic groups, there were variations in the main type of disputes with higher proportion of 
female respondents among Kipsigis (35%), Kisii (47%), and Maasai (45%) reporting disputes 
over land being the main disputes while a higher proportion of their male counterparts reported 
domestic disputes to be the most common disputes. Notably as well is that a higher proportion 
(68% female and 48% male) of respondents from the Samburu community reported ethnic 
disputes to be the most common types of disputes in the community.  
Considering the disputes mentioned above, respondents were also asked what dispute 
resolution mechanisms existed and were preferred in their communities. Figure 5 shows the 
overall proportion of dispute-resolution mechanisms disaggregated by gender. Forty-nine percent 
of respondents preferred to engage community elders in case of a dispute because they had the 
most influence on what people do regarding rules and perceptions on the rules of what is 
required, permitted, or forbidden in the community. Thirty-four percent on the other hand 
preferred to engage the national government. Two percent of respondents preferred to engage 
people like parents, teachers in school, and neighbours.  
There were significant differences by gender (p<0.001) with a higher proportion of females (39%) 
than males (30%) preferring to engage the national government. A greater proportion of females 
(10%) than males (6%) preferred to engage the county government. In contrast, more males than 
females preferred to engage community elders in conflict resolution (males 58%, females 40%). 
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This means that customary law is more dominant in conflict resolution compared to formal law. 
However, there were variations by community and within each community by gender.  
Figure 5. Preferred institution/persons for conflict or dispute resolution by gender 
 
 
Slightly more than half of respondents from the Borana (54%), Kisii (54%), and Maasai (56%) 
communities preferred to engage the national government while a majority of those from the 
Kipsigis (72%) and Samburu (90%) preferred to engage community elders (Table 3). Among the 
Somali community, a considerable proportion (48%) preferred to engage community elders. 
Table 3. Preferred institution/persons for conflict or dispute resolution by ethnic group 
  Borana 
(N=203) 
Kipsigis 
(N=202) 
Kisii 
(N=194) 
Maasai 
(N=198) 
Samburu 
(N=198) 
Somali 
(N=197) 
Other 
(N=8) 
Total 
(1200) 
National 
government 
54.2 14.4 53.6 56.1 5.6 21.8 50.0 34.3 
County 
government 
5.4 6.9 8.3 12.6 2.5 13.2 0.0 8.1 
Religious 
authorities 
4.9 4.0 7.2 2.5 0.0 14.2 0.0 5.4 
Community 
elders 
35.5 71.8 22.7 24.8 90.4 48.2 37.5 48.9 
Somebody 
else 
0.0 1.0 4.6 2.5 0.5 2.0 12.5 1.8 
Don’t know 0.0 2.0 3.6 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1.4 
 
As shown in Table A1, there were differences in the preferred conflict-resolution mechanism 
based on the type of dispute. Forty-two percent of the respondents who reported disputes over 
land to be the most common type of dispute said these would be resolved through formal law 
while 41% noted that they would be resolved by community elders. Half (50%) of those who 
reported domestic disputes to be the most common, said that these disputes would be resolved 
by community elders while 34% noted that they would be resolved by the national government.  
Details of how each community disaggregated by gender are presented in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. A higher proportion of respondents from the Kipsigis (75% female, 69% male) and 
Samburu (87% female, 94% male) communities reported that community elders were the most 
influential. There was variation by gender among Somalis with more female respondents 
preferring to engage the national government (43%) and county government (27%) in resolving 
 18 
conflicts while most men (82%) preferred engaging community elders. Qualitative interview 
participants pointed out that women’s experience with customary law differs from that of men in 
that women are oppressed while men are favoured. In contrast, they noted that the experiences 
of men and women are the same under formal laws. Thus, women might prefer government 
(formal law) because in it, they are likely to get more favourable outcomes. It is also possible that 
women prefer government law over customary law because under customary law, dispute 
resolution is primarily handled by men as is evidenced from the quotes below: 
“As I said earlier, it appears the government law is fair because it treats everyone 
equally. It benefits women more than customary law. Sometimes, when men are treated 
equally with women, there are men who still feel that they should not be treated equally 
with women, they feel that because they are men, they are more superior than women.”  
KII, Male, Prosecutor, Kisii  
Reasons given for why customary law is preferred included the following: issues are resolved 
faster, no government involvement as issues are resolved within the community, and the costs 
incurred are lower compared to government law. Further, customary law is reconciliatory and 
thus plays a vital role in maintaining relationships within the community, which are often 
adversely affected when disputes arise. However, customary law was also noted to have 
disadvantages such as lenient penalties, which meant that offenders were likely to repeat the 
offense; the elders and their judgements are sometimes biased; and it conflicts with government 
law. Although formal state law was reported to have a number of advantages—for example, it is 
binding, it restores order, it provides for stiffer penalties, and it treats all people equally—it has 
the following disadvantages: there is corruption in administering justice, the process is long and 
time-consuming, it is expensive, and in most instances it brings about division between the 
parties. Participants noted that the selection of a dispute-resolution mechanism is not binary, with 
respondents reporting that where customary law is preferred, but does not resolve the issue or 
the remedy offered is not deemed satisfactory, individuals can then resort to formal law, as is 
evidenced by the following quotes: 
“First, the men within the family call for a sitting called maiga [family sitting]. When these 
men come together, they go to the home where the theft occurred and talk about how 
theft happened in that family. They discuss how the theft came about and if they don’t 
come to a solution, then that dispute has not been resolved. They then take a further step 
and involve the village elder. If the village elder is unable to solve the dispute the matter 
is escalated to the assistant chief. But dispute resolution always begins at the family level 
through a sitting called maiga then if necessary, the matter is escalated.”  
FGD, Male, 35 years and older, Kisii 
“When it comes to stealing, she (Nyansiaboka) cannot go directly to the police. She has 
to follow the protocol that is from the village elders.”  
FGD, Female, 18–34 years, Kisii 
“Sometimes if they are not resolved at the community level, they take the legal way. If it 
is an adult, we advise for legal proceedings.”  
KII, Female, Executive Officer, Isiolo 
“If the resolution is inadequate, they go to court; the first person... the first place they 
come is to the advocate’s office, and most of the people in Kilgoris come to my office 
here.”  
KII, Female, Advocate, Kilgoris 
“I am not so sure whether the locals here understand that there is anything too big to be 
solved, but most of the cases, the ones that I have in court, are those that have become 
too troublesome, a repeat offender. Somebody who has refused to make peace at home, 
consistently has a habit of, for example stealing a cow, you become too much; even your 
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age mates say, ‘ah we can’t handle you, you need to learn a lesson,’ so they push you so 
that you are pinched somewhere, and you sort of come back a corrected person.”  
KII, Male, Prosecutor, Kilgoris 
 “When there is a dispute and it is not solved by the elders, they go to the police then it 
will be a court case.”  
KII, Female, Social Worker, Kilgoris 
The question of accessibility was also addressed, and here it was noted that enforcers of 
government law are mainly chiefs and the police while enforcers of customary law are mainly 
elders and religious leaders. Accessibility was thus framed in terms of ease of access to these 
enforcement officials. There were varying views on the accessibility of the police and the courts 
with some saying that they were accessible while others felt they were inaccessible. Accessibility 
mainly depended on distance to the police station or courts though in some instances, study 
participants defined accessibility in terms of the willingness or preference of community members 
to go to the courts or the police. 
What we see therefore, is that individuals rely on both customary and formal law systems for 
conflict resolution, and that they prefer to first begin with customary law, and only when this 
option does not work for them, do they then resort to formal law.  
With regard to criminal offences, the findings suggest that minor offences are best dealt with at 
the community level using customary mechanisms, while the more serious offences can be 
handled through formal law:  
“The reason why it starts with the elder is that when the case is taken to the police and 
the case does not involve murder or a big dispute like cattle rustling, it will be taken back 
to the clan elders since it is a small case where one is in possession of the other person’s 
foodstuffs. The accused person, the complainant, and the clan elders will sit together and 
repossess the stolen foodstuffs.”  
FGD, Female, 35 years and older, Somali 
These are important findings, which indicate that formal law might be made more appealing to 
the communities if the disadvantages in this system of law are addressed, and if community 
elders and community gatekeepers are brought on board in some aspects of enforcement of 
formal law.  
Knowledge about legality/illegality of FGM/C  
Figure 6 shows the proportions of respondents who think FGM/C is legal or not legal in Kenya in 
comparison to their knowledge of whether riding a motorbike without a helmet and paying police 
a bribe to avoid punishment are legal or not in Kenya by ethnic group. Overall, 94% of all the 
respondents thought to the best of their knowledge that FGM/C was illegal, 3% thought it was 
legal, and 3% did not know whether it was legal or not. We also looked at legal knowledge by 
ethnicity (Table A3) and found that apart from the Samburu community, over 90% of the 
respondents regardless of gender across all the communities said that FGM/C was illegal in 
Kenya. A fifth of the male respondents among the Samburu community said they did not know 
whether FGM/C was legal or illegal in Kenya with 62% saying it was illegal. Notably, as well, 
among the Samburu community, 13% of the male respondents said FGM/C was legal. This 
variation among the Samburu might be explained by the sources of law in plural legal settings, 
where it was noted that while formal law makes FGM/C illegal, the practice might still be 
supported either by culture or religion. Thus, the views on whether FGM/C is permitted morally or 
by customary law may vary depending on whether one’s culture and religion allow it.  
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Figure 6. Proportion of respondents who thought FGM/C is illegal in Kenya by ethnicity, and 
compared to those who thought riding on a motorbike without a helmet and paying police a 
bribe to avoid trouble are illegal  
 
In addition, while a majority of survey respondents were aware that FGM/C is illegal in Kenya, 
some qualitative interview participants held the view that the law banning FGM/C in Kenya is 
oppressive because the community is barred from practising FGM/C freely despite its cultural 
significance. For example, during the FGD, Kipsigis men blamed anti-FGM/C laws for the high 
divorce rates and marital problems. They believe that in the past, girls who were excised were 
disciplined and had fewer problems in their marriages. Findings from qualitative interviews 
suggest that the presence of the law banning FGM/C and the awareness of the existence of the 
law do not necessarily have a deterrent effect. Individuals might be aware of the law, but also 
feel that the law is oppressive, and thus, rather than obey the law, they resort to measures that 
might help them circumvent the law while still practising FGM/C. From the quotes below, it is 
notable that FGM/C is practised in secrecy because those involved are aware of the punitive 
action that will be taken against them if they are caught: 
“The government does not support circumcision. But there is the Somali tradition. 
Circumcision was practised in large numbers, but these days it has reduced. If today we 
go through the villages and visit them door to door, you cannot miss people who are 
doing it, though they are doing it in private. We all know it is prohibited and is not good. 
Since this is the people’s tradition, it is in the system and not left completely but the 
practice of stopping the practice is ongoing.”  
FGD, Female, 35 years and older, Somali 
Sources of information about formal and customary law 
The main source of information about formal law was the media, particularly radio and television. 
A higher proportion, 41% and 46% of the female and male respondents, respectively, reported 
radio to be the main source of information on formal law, with 27% and 18% of female and male 
respondents, respectively, noting that the main source of information was the television. There 
were however, variations across the communities and across gender with higher proportion of 
respondents from the Borana and Somali communities saying it is TV, while a higher proportion 
of respondents from the Kipsigis, Kisii, Maasai and Samburu communities reported radio to be 
the main source of information on formal law (Table A4). Slightly under a third of Kisii 
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respondents reported that the chief/assistant chief was the main source of information on formal 
law. 
Community elders were the main sources of customary information as reported by most of 
female (58%) and male (83%) respondents. Across ethnic groups however, there were slight 
variations.  All male respondents from the Somali community said that community elders were 
the main source of information while the female respondents were distributed among family and 
friends (20%), community elders (33%), and NGOs (31%) (Table A4). 
Future intentions to practise FGM/C 
From the list experiment, there was a significant difference (p=0.03) in the mean number of items 
listed by the treatment group (2.6) than the control group (2.5). This difference suggests that the 
proportion estimates shown in Table 4 are unlikely to be an artefact of the sample. When 
disaggregated by ethnicity, however, the difference in means was only significant among the 
Somali community (p=0.01) and marginally significant (0.06) among the Samburu. The estimated 
proportion of respondents with future intentions to practise FGM/C was computed as 13% among 
all respondents. The estimated proportion of respondents from the Samburu and Somali 
communities who intended to practise FGM/C was 36%.  
Table 4. Estimated proportion of respondents intending to practise FGM/C using the list 
experiment 
 Treatment group (T) Control group (C)    
 Mean 
(95% CI) 
Total 
(Tt) 
Mean 
(95% CI) 
Total 
(Ct) 
t-statistic p-
value 
Estimated 
proportion (%)  
(Tt-Ct)/Nt 
Overall 2.6 (2.5,2.7) 1573 2.5 (2.4,2.6) 1497 1.90 0.03 13 
Kipsigis 2.4 (2.2,2.6) 249 2.3 (2.1,2.5) 231 1.00 0.16 18 
Samburu 3.2 (2.9,3.5) 321 2.9 (2.7,3.1) 286 1.57 0.06 36 
Somali 2.9 (2.7,3.2) 290 2.6 (2.4,2.8) 254 2.35 0.01 36 
Maasai † 1.7 (1.6,1.9) 168 1.9 (1.7,2.0) 187 -1.44 0.92 -19† 
Kisii † 3.4 (3.1,3.7) 321 3.3 (3.0,3.6) 324 0.52 0.30 -3† 
Borana 2.1 (2.0,2.2) 209 2.0 (2.0,2.1) 209 0.39 0.35 0 
Notes: 
Proportion of those intending to practise FGM/C in the future was estimated as the difference between the 
total number of activities by the treatment group and the control group expressed as a fraction of the total 
number of respondents in the treatment group 
† Total counts in the control group were higher resulting in a negative difference between treatment and 
control group 
Nt = total number of respondents in the treatment group 
Compliance motivations 
Respondents were asked what motivates them or others to follow Kenya’s formal law on the one 
hand, and customary law on the other hand. This was not a question specific to the law 
prohibiting FGM/C, but rather our intention here was to analyse the perception of formal law in 
general, and to compare this with perceptions of customary law in general, so as to obtain data 
on what motivates people to obey the law in general. The findings would then inform the analysis 
of whether the factors that motivate people to obey law in general can be found in the context of 
the law prohibiting FGM/C in particular. Figure 7 shows proportions of male and female 
responses. 
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Figure 7. Motivating factors (self and others) for obeying Kenya’s formal law 
 
 
 
 
 
Respect for the law and fear of legal punishment were the main factors that motivate most of the 
respondents to obey Kenya’s formal law. The same two factors were also reported to motivate 
others to obey the formal law. This is contrasted with the findings by Corpovisionarios (Guillot 
2012), whereby with regard to self, intrinsic reasons such as moral obligation were cited as the 
motivation to obey the law; whereas with regard to others, extrinsic reasons, such as fear of 
punishment were cited as the motivations for obeying the law. In Kenya, we found that both 
intrinsic reasons (respect for law) and extrinsic reasons (fear of legal punishment) were cited as 
motivations for both self and others for obeying the law. Though a greater proportion of both 
males and females reported that others (relative to self) obey the law for fear of legal 
punishment. Qualitative interviews also revealed the fear of the law as an important deterrent: 
“Even me seated here I have girls, if not for the fear of this law and the chiefs, I would 
want my girl to be cut now. I fear the law and what people say but I could have 
circumcised her now. We are Somalis and if the girl is not cut then people will tell her that 
she is the unclean one; so such abuse to your child is very bad. We are unable to break 
the laws, but we could have done it because we all want our girls to be cut.” 
FGD, Male, 35 years and older, Somali 
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At the ethnicity level (Table A 5), we noted gender variation among the Maasai community with a 
higher proportion of males (63%) than females (23%) saying that fear for legal punishment 
motivates others while a higher proportion of the females (46%) than males (16%) noted that 
others were motived to obey the law because they respect the law. Among the Somali 
community, 63% and 49% of female and male respondents, respectively, said that social esteem 
motivates others.  
Figure 8 shows results of factors respondents thought motivated them and others to obey 
customary rules. Again, respect for the law was cited by most of the respondents as a motivation 
for both themselves (47% male, 36% female) as well as for others (39% male, 35% female). 
Social esteem was cited by 24% and 27% of the female respondents as a factor that motivates 
them and others, respectively, compared to 6% and 10% of the male respondents, respectively. 
Figure 8. Motivating factors (self and others) for obeying customary laws 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to disobeying the law, participants noted that there were several situations when 
people in their community (defined as “people around here”) would consider it permissible to 
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disobey Kenya’s formal law and community customs. Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the 
proportions citing these situations by gender.  
Figure 9. Proportions of respondents citing various situations when people in their community 
would consider disobeying Kenya’s formal law permissible, by gender (multiple responses 
allowed) 
 
Overall, 29% of all the respondents (22% male and 36% female, p<0.001) said people in their 
community would consider it permissible to disobey the formal law if the authorities themselves 
do not respect the law (Figure 9), while 19% (14% male and 24% female, p<0.001) said people 
would consider it permissible to disobey the law if it contradicts with religion. We found significant 
differences across ethnic groups in their responses. For example, among Somalis, 66% and 87% 
(p=0.001) of female and male respondents, respectively, noted that people in their community 
would consider it permissible to disobey the law if it contradicted religious beliefs (Table A6). In 
contrast, 62% of Borana females and 73% of Borana males (p=0.099) said people in their 
community would consider legal disobedience permissible when the authorities themselves do 
not respect the law. Differences between males and females in different ethnic groups were also 
noted. For example, while a high proportion of male respondents from the Kipsigis community 
said people would consider disobeying Kenya’s formal law permissible if it contradicts with the 
custom (49%), if one personally disagrees with the law (60%), and if authorities do not respect 
the law (65%), few women cited these reasons (7%, 34%, and 11%, respectively).  
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Figure 10. Proportion of respondents citing various situations when people in their community 
would consider disobeying customary law permissible, by gender (multiple responses allowed) 
 
 
A slightly different pattern is seen in the responses to the situations when people in respondents’ 
community would consider disobeying community customs permissible (Table A6). Contradiction 
with religion was cited by a high proportion of respondents (disaggregated by gender) from the 
Borana community (78% female, 54% male, p<0.001), Kipsigis community (49% female, 57% 
Mmale, p=0.256), Maasai community (female 6%, male 66%, p<0.001), and Somali community 
(75% female, 95% male, p<0.001). Contradiction with the formal law was also cited as a 
prominent reason why people would disobey community customs among sections of 
respondents from the Borana, Kipsigis, Kisii, and Samburu communities. Sixty-eight percent of 
male respondents from the Kispigis community said people would disobey community customs if 
they contradict the formal law, while 40% and 51% of female and male respondents respectively 
from the Kisii community, 41% of the male respondents from the Samburu community, and 57% 
of the male respondents from the Borana community cited the restrictiveness of the custom. 
Notably as well, a considerable proportion of Maasai female respondents (38%) and male 
respondents from Samburu (47%) said they did not know why people would disobey community 
customs.  
The qualitative interviews also showed that while fear of punishment is a motivation for obeying 
the law, other factors such as religion and custom, and the failures of the formal law system also 
influence the decisions individuals make either to obey or disobey. In particular, participants 
noted that conflict between various systems of law in a plural legal setting causes people to 
make decisions that will lead them to comply with one law, but then disobey the other. Thus, for 
instance, participants noted that people might disobey formal law if it conflicts either with religion 
or custom or vice versa. Thus, for example, religion can influence people to disobey the formal 
law banning FGM/C if there exists a belief that FGM/C is required under one’s religion. Custom 
might influence decisions within the family or clan to comply with customary provisions that 
require girls and women to undergo FGM/C and in turn, this would mean that a decision is made 
to disobey the formal law which conflicts with custom. What we see, therefore, is that there is a 
need to address the conflicts between different sources of law in a plural legal setting in order to 
achieve high levels of compliance.  
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“M: Would a circumciser be considered a lawbreaker, maybe by the family, the girls’ 
relatives, or neighbours? 
P: Not in the community, because FGM/C is still practised, but to the government, yes. 
But in the community, they do not think they are breaking any law and they are asking 
why they should not practise FGM/C.”  
KII, Female Leader, Samburu 
 “….in our religion, we are allowed to cut, some girls are taken far to other countries to be 
cut for fear of being arrested, so they are taken to Mandera and then to Somalia.”  
FGD Male, 35 years and older, Somali 
“Actually, we have to provide relevant training or sensitisation to inform people or make 
members of the community be more informed of what is happening in order to avoid this 
conflict between customary laws and government laws.”  
KII, Male, Sub-County Administrator, Kipsigis 
Furthermore, gender also emerged as a factor that might influence the decision to obey or 
disobey the law. For example, men were noted to be more likely to disobey the formal law 
system because of internal failures within the formal law system, such as corruption or failure of 
government officials to adhere to the law. This means interventions aimed at ensuring 
compliance must be informed by gender differences.  
Religious and traditional beliefs regarding FGM/C practice 
Respondents were asked whether they believed FGM/C is permitted by their religion and 
customs and compared with what they thought on riding a motorbike without a helmet and paying 
police a bribe to avoid punishment. Table 5 shows these results disaggregated by gender. 
Table 5. Perceptions on whether FGM/C is permitted by religion and customs 
  Female  
(N=600) 
Male 
(N=600) 
Total 
(N=1200) 
P-value 
Believe that the following are permitted by religion   
FGM/C 60 (10.1) 135 (22.6) 195 (16.3) <0.001 
Riding on a motorbike without a helmet 25 (4.4) 44 (7.7) 69 (6.1) 0.021 
Paying police a bribe to avoid punishment 12 (2.3) 8 (1.5) 20 (1.9) 0.145 
Believe that the following are permitted by customs  
FGM/C 415 (69.6) 455 (76.2) 870 (72.9) 0.012 
Riding on a motorbike without a helmet 96 (17.0) 65 (11.3) 161 (14.1) 0.007 
Paying police a bribe to avoid punishment 82 (15.8) 17 (3.1) 99 (9.3) <0.001 
 
We found that 16% of all the respondents believed that FGM/C is permitted by their religion with 
23% of male respondents holding this belief compared to 10% of females, p<0.001. Asked 
whether they believed FGM/C was permitted by their customs, 73% of all the respondents said 
they believed that FGM/C was permitted and this contrasted sharply with riding on a motorbike 
without a helmet (14%) as well as paying a bribe to the police to avoid punishment (9%). These 
results suggest that the anti-FGM/C law is likely in conflict with customs or religion, which might 
affect enforcement of the anti-FGM/C law. In contrast, the law prohibiting riding a motorbike 
without a helmet or paying a bribe to the police is not likely to conflict either with custom or 
religion, and hence, it might be easier to enforce these laws.  
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Figure 11. Proportion of respondents agreeing that FGM/C is permitted by religion or custom, 
by ethnic group 
 
 
 
At the ethnicity level (Figure 11), there was a significant difference in the proportion of males 
(83%) compared to females (44%) who believed that FGM/C is permitted by their religion. The 
proportion of respondents who believed FGM/C is permitted by their religion was highest among 
male and female Somalis and Borana males. It is important to note that the Somali and Borana 
communities are predominantly Muslim communities. Among the respondents from the Samburu 
community, 52% of the female respondents and 60% of the male respondents believed that 
FGM/C is not permitted by their religion, with 44% of females and 25% of males not knowing 
whether it was permitted.  
Perceptions on whether FGM/C is permitted by community customs differed by gender among 
respondents from Kipsigis, Kisii and Maasai communities. A higher proportion of male (71%) 
than females (30%) respondents from the Kipsigis community believed FGM/C is permitted by 
their customs. The same pattern was noted among the Maasai community with 64% of the male 
respondents believing that FGM/C is permitted by their community customs compared to 30% of 
their female counterparts. In contrast, a greater proportion of Kisii females (67%) than males 
(38%) believed that FGM/C is permitted by their community customs. There were few differences 
between males and females among the Borana, Samburu, and Somali communities. 
When is it acceptable to disobey Kenya’s formal law? 
Respondents were asked to give situations when it would be acceptable to disobey Kenya’s 
formal law by responding yes or no to a set of situations. Table 6 shows proportions of those who 
agreed with these questions disaggregating them by gender. 
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Table 6. Number and proportion of respondents who agree that it is acceptable to disobey 
Kenya’s formal law in certain situations, by gender 
Situation Female 
(N=600) 
Male 
(N=600) 
Total  
(N=1200) 
p-value 
If this law is clearly against one’s moral principles   200 (33.3) 197 (32.8) 397 (33.1) 0.886 
If one would find it too costly to obey this law   182 (30.3) 167 (27.8) 349 (29.1) 0.297 
If one knows that this law is not enforced   178 (29.7) 165 (27.5) 343 (28.6) 0.357 
If one knows that most of the people he or she 
knows best do not follow this law   
99 (16.5) 164 (27.3) 263 (21.9) <0.001 
If one knows that most of the people he or she 
knows best would approve of breaking this law   
98 (16.3) 121 (20.2) 219 (18.3) 0.081 
If one does not know about this law   187 (31.2) 259 (43.2) 446 (37.2) <0.001 
If one thinks that this law was made without 
representing the interests of people like him or 
her   
249 (41.5) 236 (39.3) 485 (40.4) 0.404 
If one thinks this law is enforced unfairly   298 (49.7) 319 (53.2) 617 (51.4) 0.247 
 
As shown in Table 6, significant differences by gender were noted in the proportion of 
respondents who agreed that it would be acceptable to break/disobey Kenya’s formal law if one 
knew that most of the people he/she knew best did not follow the law (17% female, 27% male, 
p<0.001) and also if one did not know about that law (31% female, 43% male, p<0.001). High, 
though not statistically significantly different by gender, 50% of female respondents and 53% of 
male respondents interviewed said it would be acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law if one 
thinks the law is enforced unfairly. Forty-one percent and 39% of the female and male 
respondents, respectively, said it would be acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law if one thinks 
the law was made without representing the interests of people like him/her. Notably as well, 43% 
of males and 31% of females admitted that it would be acceptable to break/disobey it if one did 
not know about the law. 
At the ethnicity level (Table A7), a higher proportion of female respondents from the Somali 
community (>80%) said it would be acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law if the law is clearly 
against one’s moral principles, if one finds it too costly to obey the law, if one knows that the law 
is not enforced, if one does not know about the law, if one thinks the law was made without 
representing the interest of people like him/her, or if one thinks the law is enforced unfairly, 
compared to less than 65% of their male counterparts citing the same reasons. There were 
gender variations from the Samburu and Kipsigis communities with more male respondents 
saying it would be acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law if one does not know about the law 
(61% Kipsigis, 75% Samburu); if one thinks the law was made without representing the interest 
of people like him/her (62% Kipsigis, 67% Samburu); or if one thinks the law is enforced unfairly 
(74% Kipsigis, 84% Samburu), while less than 25% of the female respondents from the two 
communities cited the same reasons, apart from the 38% of the female respondents from 
Kipsigis community who said it is acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law if one thinks the law is 
enforced unfairly. Less than 30% of both female and male respondents from the Kisii community 
cited the above reasons, with 70% or more thinking it is not acceptable to break Kenya’s formal 
law. Among the Maasai community, apart from 56% of male respondents who said it would be 
acceptable if the law is clearly against one’s moral principles, more than 60% said it is not 
acceptable to break Kenya’s formal law in any of the other circumstances listed. 
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Perceived FGM/C practice compared to other criminalised conduct 
To assess whether there are any variances in the way individuals might respond to issues 
concerning criminalised conduct that is rooted in tradition such as FGM/C and criminalised 
conduct that is not rooted in any tradition, respondents were asked whether they thought people 
in their communities practised FGM/C. We contrasted the responses to those by asking 
respondents if they thought people in their communities rode motorbike without a helmet or paid 
bribes to the police to avoid punishment. Figure 12 shows the overall proportions and proportions 
disaggregated by gender. 
Figure 12. Proportion of respondents who believe that people in their community practise 
FGM/C, ride a motorbike without a helmet and pay bribes to the police to avoid punishment, by 
gender 
 
 
Fifty-nine percent of all respondents thought FGM/C is practised in their community with 57% of 
the female respondents and 60% of the male respondents interviewed having the same belief. In 
contrast, 95% of respondents thought that people in their community ride a motorbike without a 
helmet, and 90% that people pay the police a bribe to avoid punishment. What this tells us is that 
individuals were more forthcoming with information concerning criminalised conduct that is not 
rooted in custom, or tradition. This finding suggests that people may underreport criminal conduct 
for activities that are rooted in custom such as FGM/C. Table 7 shows results disaggregated by 
ethnicity. Details of perceptions of male and female respondents in each ethnic group are 
presented in Table A8. 
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Table 7. Proportion of respondents who believe that people in their community practise 
FGM/C, ride a motorbike without a helmet, and pay bribes to the police to avoid punishment, 
by ethnicity 
  Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali Other Total 
(N=203) (N=202) (N=194) (N=198) (N=198) (N=197) (N=8) N=1200 
Do you think that people in your community practise female genital mutilation/excision? 
Yes 73.9 14.9 46.4 31.8 87.5 96.5 85.8 58.5 
No 26.1 84.6 49.5 66.7 12.5 1.5 8.1 39.2 
Refused 
to answer 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 
Don’t 
know 
0.0 0.5 4.1 1.6 0.0 1.0 6.1 2.2 
Do you think that people in your community ride on motorbikes without a helmet? 
Yes 95.0 86.9 99.0 95.7 100.0 93.7 99.0 94.9 
No 5.0 12.1 1.0 4.3 0.0 6.3 1.0 4.9 
Don’t 
know 
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Do you think that people in your community pay police bribes to avoid punishment? 
Yes 97.9 78.8 94.5 86.4 75.0 82.3 100.0 90.3 
No 1.6 13.5 2.8 9.7 12.5 8.1 0.0 5.8 
Don’t 
know 
0.5 7.8 2.8 4.0 12.5 9.7 0.0 3.9 
Results show that there was significant variation by ethnicity on perceptions of whether FGM/C 
was practised in their communities. Three quarters or more of respondents from the Borana 
(74%), Samburu (88%), and Somali (96%) communities thought FGM/C was practised in their 
community while a quarter of respondents from the Kipsigis community, 46% from the Kisii, and 
32% from the Maasai community also thought FGM/C was practised in their community. 
Compared to other activities, a higher proportion of respondents from Kipsigis community 
thought people in their community ride on motorbikes without a helmet (87%) and pay bribes to 
the police to avoid punishment (79%). A similar pattern is seen among those from the Kisii and 
Maasai communities. 
Perception of FGM/C practice also varied by gender (Table A8). Among the Kisii community, for 
example, 59% of male respondents and 35% of females thought FGM/C is practised in their 
community. Among respondents from the Borana community, a very high proportion of male 
respondents (98%) thought FGM/C is practised in their community compared to 50% of their 
female counterparts. As noted earlier, these results suggest that people may underreport 
prohibited activities that are rooted in culture.  
The findings from the qualitative interviews suggest that gender differences may also stem from 
the limited involvement of males in FGM/C decisions. This viewpoint is illustrated in the following 
quotes from Maasai participants:  
“The father does not know when the girl is cut. Those things happen on holiday and when 
the father goes to look after the cattle, the girl is left at home.”  
FGD, Male, 35 years and older, Maasai  
“Normally this practice of the cut to girls, its decision is not the father but mother. It is the 
women that plan. The mother with her friends in the village do it. In the past it was not a 
secret to the fathers, but nowadays, ... when they do it, they do it when the father does 
not know. It is done by the mother and her friends. It is not the father’s decision.” 
FGD, Male, 35 years and older, Maasai  
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Respondents were also asked to estimate how many girls and women in their communities had 
been cut. Table 8 summarises the results of respondents’ perceptions about the number of girls 
and women who had undergone FGM/C in their communities. Results are disaggregated by 
gender. 
Table 8. Perceptions about number of girls and women who had undergone FGM/C, by gender 
  Female Male Total p-value 
How many girls in your community do you think are 
cut? 
       
All girls 12.4 3.5 8.0 <0.001 
Most girls 28.3 37.0 32.7 0.002 
Some girls 10.2 11.9 11.1 0.350 
A few girls 17.8 15.8 16.8 0.360 
No girls 27.0 25.5 26.2 0.560 
Don’t know 4.2 6.4 5.3 0.060 
How many women in your community do you think are 
cut? 
       
All women 48.2 27.6 37.9 <0.001 
Most women 39.6 50.8 45.2 <0.001 
Some women 6.7 9.2 8.0 0.110 
A few women 3.2 4.2 3.7 0.360 
No woman 1.0 5.4 3.2 <0.001 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.2 0.1 - 
Don’t know 1.3 2.7 2.0 0.100 
Forty-one percent of all respondents thought all (8%) or most girls (33%) had been cut, 28% 
thought some or a few girls, 26% thought no girl had been cut, and 5% did not know. There were 
significant variations in the response by gender (p<0.001) with a higher proportion of females 
(12%) than males (4%) believing that all girls had been cut. However, more male respondents 
(37%) than female respondents (28%) thought most girls had been cut.  
Perceptions on number of girls and women who had undergone FGM/C varied largely by 
ethnicity with high proportions of both male and female respondents from the Kipsigis and 
Maasai communities thinking a few or no girl had been cut (Table A8). Among the Borana, 
perceptions varied by gender with 55% of the female respondents thinking a few or no girls had 
been cut compared to only 10% of males. We also sought to understand if what they perceived 
about girls would be any different from what they perceived about adult women. With the 
exception of Maasai males, across all communities, majority (>50%) of respondents thought that 
all or most women had been cut. These results suggest that adult women are more likely to have 
undergone FGM/C than girls younger than 18 years: 
However, when triangulated with the qualitative data, these results underscored that FGM/C is 
now practised in secret in order to avoid the law, and further that communities generally do not 
talk openly about FGM/C: 
“The law makes FGM/C be done in secret; you will never hear that someone has cut her 
daughter. It is all done in secret thanks to the law….”  
FGD, Female, 35 years and older, Turkana 
“It [FGM] is done in secret. People do not know. Leaders talk in meetings, communities 
just listen to them and do what they want to do…. I cannot know whether my neighbour’s 
daughter is cut because nobody talks about it because the law does not allow it, you do it 
secretly.”  
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KII, Female, Chief of Staff, Samburu 
The implication here is that communities generally will not talk openly about FGM/C, and this 
might affect the responses given to direct questions concerning FGM/C. Hence, individuals are 
not likely to give accurate responses to direct questions about FGM/C, and this might be 
influenced by fear of the law.  
Reasons for the practice of FGM/C 
Eighty-two percent of respondents noted that tradition was the main reason why people in their 
community practised FGM/C. Table 9 summarises the results of reasons why respondents 
thought FGM/C is practised in their community Moreover, the instrumental role of FGM/C in 
controlling female sexuality was cited as the primary reason for the practice. Qualitative interview 
participants noted that girls and women who do not undergo FGM/C were stigmatised, a factor 
that led many girls and women to take part in the practice. 
“It is the culture that has been practised for ages and it is the custom which dictates that 
girls should be cut irrespective of the law.”  
FGD, Female, 18–34 years, Somali 
“We don’t know the reason, but if you look keenly, you find that most women think that 
uncircumcised girls have a high libido, so they say that when that part is cut, the girl’s 
desire to have sex is reduced and so her sexual discipline is maintained.”  
FGD, Male, 35 years and older, Maasai 
“Our people used to say that if the girl is not circumcised and is left like that, she will 
become a prostitute and she loves men...”  
KII, Female, Chief, Isiolo 
“The mother is the one who will say that her daughter should be circumcised. The 
reasons are the transition of the daughter from childhood to adulthood, other one is the 
mother will have seen this as a qualification to be called a mother as in our community 
we believe that an uncircumcised girl is not responsible, and again she cannot participate 
in any occasion because she is believed to be a child.”  
FGD, Male, 18–34 years, Kipsigis 
Table 9. Reasons for the practice of FGM/C among interviewed respondents, by gender 
  Female Male Total p-value 
Why do you think people in your community continue to practice FGM/C  
Everyone else does it 3.4 2.2 2.8 0.150 
Religious obligations 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.500 
Tradition 74.4 90.1 82.2 <0.001 
There are a few penalties for doing so 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.252 
Other 13.1 3.4 8.2 <0.001 
Don’t know 7.4 2.7 5.0 <0.001 
Refused to answer 0.5 0.0 0.3 - 
 
Only 3% said that people in their community practise FGM/C because everyone else practised it 
(Table 1). Religious obligations were cited by 1% of the respondents and 5% did not know the 
reason why their communities practised it. What we see, therefore, is that while FGM/C is 
perceived as a practise that finds meaning in cultural expression, the motivations for practising it 
are generally individual. Other reasons given for the practise of FGM/C included lack of 
education and legal knowledge, for marital reasons, pressure from older circumcised women and 
girls, lack of understanding of the adverse effects, personal choice, and that it was their right. 
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There was significant variation by gender with 90% of the male respondents compared to 74% of 
the female respondents citing tradition as the main reason why FGM/C occurs in their 
community.  
At the ethnicity level, apart from the female respondents from the Kipsigis community, more than 
70% of the respondents believed their communities practised FGM/C because it was a tradition 
(Table A9). Sixteen percent of female respondents from the Samburu community and 8% of male 
respondents from the Kisii community said people practise FGM/C because everyone else does 
it.  
Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C 
Respondents were asked whether they would consider continuing FGM/C practice, riding a 
motorbike without a helmet, or paying bribes if everyone else in their community discontinued 
these practises. Figure 13 shows the overall proportions disaggregated by gender of those who 
said they would continue with the practice even if everyone else discontinued it. 
Figure 13. Proportion of respondents who would continue FGM/C practice, riding a motorbike 
without a helmet, or paying bribes if everyone else in their community discontinued these 
practises, by gender 
 
 
Eight percent of all respondents stated that they would continue to practise FGM/C even if 
everyone else in their communities discontinued the practice. Disaggregated by gender, 8% of 
the female respondents and 9% of the male respondents stated that they would continue 
practising FGM/C even if others in their community discontinued the practice. Compared to 
continuing FGM/C practice, less than 5% of both male and female respondents said they would 
continue with the practice of riding on a motorbike without a helmet and paying police a bribe to 
avoid punishment if everyone else in their community were to discontinue.  
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Figure 14. Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C in comparison with paying police bribe and 
riding on a motorbike without a helmet 
 
 
Figure 14 and Table A9 disaggregate these results by ethnicity. A relatively higher proportion of 
female respondents (19%) and male respondents (33%) from the Samburu community compared 
to other communities interviewed said they wound continue practising FGM/C even if everyone 
else in their community discontinued. In addition, compared to their male counterparts (5%), a 
relatively high proportion of the female respondents from the Somali community (18%) stated 
that they would continue with the practice. Fewer than 10% of respondents from the other 
communities stated that they continue with the practice if everyone else discontinued it. Thus, 
acceptance of the practice within the community is a major factor that influences individuals to 
make the decision to engage in the practice of FGM/C.  
Asked whether individually they believed that FGM/C should be stopped or should continue, 
overall, 12% of all respondents stated that FGM/C should continue. This figure is close to the list 
experiment results, which show that 13% of the respondents would continue to practise FGM/C 
despite the existence of the anti-FGM/C law. Disaggregated by gender, 10% of female 
respondents and 15% of male respondents said the practise should continue (Figure 15).  
Figure 15. Proportions of respondents who think that FGM/C, the practice of riding a motorbike 
without a helmet, and paying bribes should continue, by gender 
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Notably, responses varied by gender among the Samburu community and slightly among the 
Somali community. A higher proportion of the female respondents (68%) from the Samburu 
community than males (33%) said the practice should be stopped. Compared to their male 
counterparts (5%), a relatively high proportion of female respondents from the Somali community 
(13%) would continue with the practice.  
Respondents were also asked what they would do if they found out that a neighbour was going 
to practise FGM/C. Forty-seven percent of males and 38% of female indicated that they would 
notify the chief. Notably, about a fifth of the respondents would do nothing about it with the 
proportions who would do nothing differing significantly by ethnic group (Table A10). A high 
proportion of respondents from the Samburu community (53% female, 63% male) stated that 
they would do nothing about it. Apart from respondents from the Borana and Samburu 
communities, more male than female respondents would notify the chief, with three-quarters of 
Maasai and Somali men indicating that they would notify the chief compared with 59% and 42% 
of their female counterparts, respectively. The proportion of respondents who would talk to a 
family member was highest among respondents from the Borana community (42% female and 
24% male) compared to less than 11% of the respondents from the other five ethnic groups. 
These results suggest that chiefs play a significant role in the enforcement of the law against 
FGM/C.  
Awareness of social costs of FGM/C  
Asked whether in their opinion life in the village was more difficult or less difficult for uncut 
women, 79% of female and 70% of male respondents from the Samburu community said that life 
would be more much more difficult for uncut women (Table A10). A relatively high proportion of 
respondents from the Somali community (31% of females and 29% of males) also felt that life 
would be much more difficult for uncut women. In contrast, 86% of females from the Borana 
community and 73% of Kipsigis males thought that life would be much less difficult for uncut 
women.  
The data indicate that respondents were generally aware of both the positive and negative 
consequences of FGM/C. Respondents noted that the major consequences of having women or 
girls undergo FGM/C include complications during delivery, excessive bleeding, reduced sexual 
urge, infections, death, and psychological issues. The major consequences of not having girls or 
women undergo FGM/C include stigma, that they might not get married, might be promiscuous, 
and might face social discrimination. Study participants also identified positive consequences for 
women or girls who do not undergo FGM/C with some noting that there were no consequences 
faced. The positive consequences of abandoning FGM/C that were cited included that the girl or 
woman will continue with her education, will be a role model, will have good health, and will get 
married. As noted in the following quote, in making the decision to abide by the law, some 
participants explained that they weighed the benefits and costs of practising FGM/C:  
“Regarding FGM/C, we no longer accept the cut because the girl might bleed till she dies 
and one might miss the girl and the cows (bride wealth). It is better we accept the law.”  
FGD, Female, 35 years and older, Kipsigis 
Asked if neighbours would approve or disapprove if they cut their daughters, over 75% of the 
respondents from the Borana, Kipsigis, Kisii, and Maasai communities said their neighbours 
would disapprove it (Table A10). Among the Samburu community, 84% of the female and 87% of 
the male respondents said their neighbours would approve or strongly approve if they cut their 
daughters, with only 11% and 6% of the female and male respondents saying their neighbours 
would disapprove. There were significant gender differences among respondents from the 
Somali community with a relatively higher proportion of females (85%) saying their neighbours 
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would approve or strongly approve and 74% of males saying their neighbours would disapprove 
or strongly disapprove if they cut their daughters. Twenty-three% of male respondents from the 
Somali community said they did not know whether their neighbours would approve or disapprove 
it. 
Support for abandonment programmes 
In Figure 16, which summarises the results from the endorsement experiment, we see that a high 
proportion of both female and male respondents were strongly in support of FGM/C 
abandonment programmes regardless of who endorsed them. However, among the few who 
would oppose them, we noted that more males than females reported that they would oppose 
these programmes irrespective of who endorsed them (7–11% vs 3%, p<0.05). 
Figure 16. Support for a programme by community elders (traditional), government, and 
religious leaders to educate parents about FGM/C and convince them not to cut their 
daughters. 
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The endorsement experiment results by disaggregated by ethnicity and gender are presented in 
Table A11. Over 85% of respondents from the Borana, Somali, Maasai, and Kisii communities 
indicated that they would support or strongly support abandonment programmes regardless of 
who endorsed them. Among respondents from the Samburu community, 75% of females 
indicated that they would support or strongly support such programmes while only 32% of males 
would. Particularly, 48% of males and 25% of females would oppose or strongly oppose it. A 
similar pattern was seen when they were asked whether they would support the programme if it 
were endorsed by community elders, the Kenyan government, or religious leaders.  
Among respondents from the Borana community, a majority would support such programmes 
regardless of who endorsed them. However, 11% of the females and 8% of the males would 
oppose such programmes even if they did not know who supported it. If the programme was 
supported by the community elders, the proportion of Borana male respondents who would 
oppose or strongly oppose it doubled to 16% while that of female slightly increased to 15%. All 
respondents from the Kisii community indicated that they would support or strongly support 
abandonment programmes even if they did not know who endorsed them. However, 13% of Kisii 
males indicated that they would oppose the programme if they knew community leaders had 
endorsed the programme. Similarly, 16% of Kisii males indicated that they would oppose the 
programme if they knew the programme was endorsed by the Kenyan government. A greater 
proportion of Kisii males than females indicated that they would oppose the programme if it was 
endorsed by community leaders or the Kenyan government. 
Discussion  
The objectives of this study were to assess the extent to which people obey the law on FGM/C; 
to investigate the reasons and causes that motivate people born into a tradition of FGM/C to 
obey or not to obey a law prohibiting FGM/C; and to establish the legal, policy, and programme 
responses, across varying contexts, that would most effectively reduce the practice of FGM/C. 
The findings indicate that criminal law plays an instrumental role in addressing FGM/C, because 
the fear of criminal sanctions is a motivating factor for people to obey the law. However, the fear 
of criminal sanctions for those who are caught might also have the effect of pushing the practice 
underground and into secrecy. As was noted from our list experiment, 13% of survey 
respondents indicated that they would cut their daughter or granddaughter in the future, despite 
there being a law that prohibits the practice. Hence, despite their knowledge of the law, people 
are still willing to continue with an illegal act. We can infer, therefore, that the only option 
available to them and in order to avoid the law is to go underground and cut in secrecy.  
Our findings also show that religion and custom/tradition influence the decisions that individuals 
make concerning FGM/C. We see that in plural legal settings, where formal law is likely to 
conflict with religion and custom, individuals are likely to make decisions that are aligned with 
one or the other system. It is therefore not a given that in situations where formal law conflicts 
with religion or custom, individuals will decide to obey the formal law. They might make the 
decision to comply with either religion or custom at the expense of formal law, especially where 
they feel that the formal law is oppressive; was not enacted following a participatory process; or 
where there are internal failures within the formal law system itself, for example, if laws are 
poorly enforced, if there is corruption, or if the enforcement authorities do not themselves abide 
by the law. In addition, we found that in Kenya, individuals generally prefer conflict-resolution 
mechanisms offered under customary law, and it is only in situations where these mechanisms 
fail that they then opt for processes under formal law. This is key, because for criminal matters, 
the legal system is structured in such a way as to only permit and recognise mechanisms under 
formal law. Thus, while individuals might prefer a process where they seek assistance first under 
customary law, moving to formal law only upon the failure of customary law, such a process is 
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neither provided for nor permitted under Kenya’s legal system. Since FGM/C is a criminal law 
matter, this then means that the only recognised mechanism for dealing with it is under formal 
law.  
Further, we saw that in the case of FGM/C, there was a feeling among some respondents that 
the anti-FGM/C law conflicts with their religious and customary beliefs, and further that it is 
oppressive to the extent that it denies and downplays the cultural significance of FGM/C. From 
this, we can infer that some individuals might then make the decision not to comply with the anti-
FGM/C law because of the conflict between the formal law and religious or customary beliefs. 
The implication here is that it is necessary to find meaningful ways of addressing the inherent 
conflicts between the anti-FGM/C law in Kenya and religion and customs, which are also 
recognised as sources of law.  
This means that people will be more likely to obey a formal law (possibly even one that conflicts 
with religion or customs) if the formal law is internally cohesive and provides adequate room for 
cultural pride. Further, where a law is made using a top-down approach, it is likely that this law 
will not inspire compliance among citizens. Hence, the making of law ought to be based on a 
participatory process, taking a bottom-up approach and respecting the aspirations of ordinary 
people. Since the anti-FGM/C law in Kenya has already been passed, it might be useful to 
design approaches that allow for citizens to buy into the law. These would entail approaches that 
do not necessarily use the fear-of-punishment message, but which adopt messaging that aims to 
have people feel that they have been involved in the enforcement and implementation processes 
of the law.  
Our findings suggest that while cultural practises find expression in communal practises, the 
motivations for following customs are themselves individual. Thus, if a law is enacted that 
criminalises conduct that is not rooted in custom and the community begins to follow that law, it is 
likely that the communal obedience of the law will have a significant impact on individual choice 
to obey the law. On the other hand, where criminalised conduct is rooted in custom, communal 
obedience of the law might not necessarily impact individual choice to obey the law, and this may 
be attributed to the fact that such a law would be in conflict with the custom upon which the 
conduct is rooted. Thus, the conflict between law and custom would necessarily have to be 
addressed to influence the individual choice to obey the law.  
Our findings also suggest that internal failures of the formal law system need to be addressed to 
give the formal law system social legitimacy. Although formal law was reported to have a number 
of advantages—for example it is binding, it restores order, it provides for stiffer penalties, and it 
treats all people equally—it is not a preferred option because of the following disadvantages: 
there is corruption in administering justice, the formal legal process is long and time-consuming, 
it is expensive, and, in most instances, believed to bring about division between the parties.  
We also saw significant variation by gender and by ethnicity among the population that was 
studied. This indicates that approaches to anti-FGM/C programmes ought to be designed in a 
manner that is differentiated by gender and by ethnicity. Consequently, what might work for 
women in one part of the country might not work for men in a different part of the country. Still, 
even in the same community, the male and female aspirations and level of knowledge differ and 
all anti-FGM/C activities must be privy to these differences. 
Our findings also suggest that a majority of the study population have significantly high levels of 
awareness concerning various aspects of FGM/C. Thus, the majority are aware that FGM/C is 
illegal; are also aware of the harmful effects of FGM/C; would report cases of FGM/C to the chief, 
suggesting that there is awareness of where to seek assistance; and are also aware of the 
conflicts between the formal anti-FGM/C law and their religious or customary beliefs. Further, our 
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findings suggest that knowledge of the harmful effects of FGM/C has influenced changing trends 
in the practice. Thus, for instance, respondents reported that FGM/C is not likely to be performed 
on young girls, but at the same time they also indicated that adult women might be cut. The trend 
of cutting adult women has been reported widely in Kenya by the media and it is also at the heart 
of the constitutional petition challenging the constitutionality of the Prohibition of FGM Act. We 
can, therefore, make the inference that lack of awareness (of harmful effects of FGM/C and of 
the law prohibiting the practice) is not the primary reason why people fail to obey the law. This 
means that in designing sensitisation programmes, the issues around which to raise awareness 
should not be limited to the harmful effects of FGM/C and/or the law prohibiting FGM/C. Other 
key issues ought to be included in sensitisation approaches, for example, highlighting how the 
anti-FGM/C law might be aligned to religion or custom, because from our findings, the conflict 
between formal law on the one hand and customary and religious law on the other influences the 
decisions made concerning FGM/C. It would be useful to address this conflict during sensitisation 
campaigns. 
Of great significance is the finding that individuals are likely to provide less accurate information 
with regard to FGM/C as compared with other criminalised conduct such as riding on a motorbike 
without a helmet, which is a traffic offence, or paying a bribe to the police. Our findings here 
indicated that respondents were less forthcoming with information about FGM/C, but were more 
willing to provide information about the other two. The only difference between FGM/C and the 
other two is that FGM/C is rooted in tradition and is practised for cultural reasons. Further, we 
found that the criminalisation of FGM/C and the fear of penal sanctions might be pushing the 
practice into secrecy and individuals therefore do not talk freely about the practice. This suggests 
that criminalisation of FGM/C and the fear of penal sanctions might actually influence people to 
provide inaccurate information when directly questioned about FGM/C, indicating the possibility 
of false self-reporting among communities where FGM/C is practised.  
Overall, these findings suggest that FGM/C may become less common in the general Kenyan 
population. They also allay concerns that legal prohibition of FGM/C only drives the practice 
underground as the estimated proportion of respondents who intend to practise FGM/C is 
relatively low. That said, it is important to note that efforts to reduce FGM/C, by way of law and 
other instruments, have been far less effective among particular ethnic groups. Finally, the 
findings presented thus far also suggest where authorities and civil society should focus future 
efforts if they hope to end the practice. 
Limitations 
While this study set out to investigate the incidence of depressed self-reporting in DHS data by 
means of the list experiment, our findings do not provide statistics on current FGM/C prevalence 
for purposes of comparison with DHS data. What we have instead is an estimation of the 
percentage of people in the study population who are likely to carry out FGM/C in the future, 
despite the existence of a law prohibiting the practice. This is still an important finding as it 
provides data about future activity, and thus is useful for purposes of programmatic interventions.  
From our findings, we are not able to determine whether there is a causal relationship between 
the anti-FGM/C law on the one hand, and declining FGM/C prevalence. What we can highlight, 
however, is that penal sanctions in and of themselves are not likely to cause compliance with the 
anti-FGM/C law. Religion and custom play an important role in influencing people’s decision 
either to comply with the law or not to, thus, these factors are also likely to have an impact on the 
prevalence of FGM/C.  
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Conclusion  
From our findings we can conclude that while criminal law is important in efforts aimed at the 
abandonment of FGM/C, its effectiveness is curtailed by other factors. The factors include 
conflicts between formal criminal law on the one hand and religion and custom on the other; and 
the internal failures within the criminal law system. These factors ought to be addressed in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of criminal law. More important is the need to give formal criminal 
law some level of social legitimacy, by ensuring that the process of developing the law is not only 
participatory but respects the aspirations and dignity of the people. Their participation and input 
are critical and must always be sought. 
Implications for policy/programmes/research 
The findings from this study indicate that while fear of legal sanctions is a key factor in motivating 
people to obey the law, this in itself might not have the desired effect of having people comply 
with the law. Fear of legal sanctions can also cause people to develop mechanisms that help 
them to evade the law. In the case of FGM/C in Kenya, people in practising communities have 
developed mechanisms to enable them to evade the law, including under-reporting FGM/C and 
carrying out the practice in secret. In light of this key finding, this study makes the specific 
recommendation that Kenya’s legal framework on the prohibition of FGM/C should be reviewed 
with the aim of making it more acceptable to practising communities, so that they can buy into 
the law and ultimately comply with it. Such a review of the law can be achieved in the following 
ways: 
• Research should be conducted to obtain the views of key stakeholders in practising 
communities (these include community leaders, religious leaders, women’s groups, youth 
groups, and CBOs involved in the fight against FGM/C) on the issues within the legal 
framework prohibiting FGM/C in Kenya that require review and how such a review ought 
to be done. 
• Research should be conducted to obtain the views of law enforcement officials (including 
police officers, prosecutors, and judicial officers) on the issues within Kenya’s legal 
framework on the prohibition of FGM/C that make enforcement of the law difficult, and 
proposals as to how these might be addressed. 
• Proposals from the findings of the research activities suggested above should be made 
to relevant stakeholders, and in particular, the law reform commission, which is 
mandated to review all laws in Kenya and to initiate processes of law reform.  
• Reform of Kenya’s anti-FGM/C law should take a bottom-up approach and at all key 
stages, communities should be involved and their views taken into account through 
targeted public-participation strategies. 
In addition to these specific recommendations, we make the following general recommendations: 
Programmatic implications 
Interventions aimed at ensuring implementation of the law: 
• Should not be done in siloes but instead should target multiple groups, including 
government law enforcement officials, religious leaders, and community leaders. A key 
feature is creating a platform from which these different groups can have conversations 
and possibly learn from each other.  
• Should be differentiated by gender and ethnicity. 
 41 
• Should be tailor-made for specific communities—what works in one context might not 
necessarily work in another. 
Policy implications 
• There is a need to use innovative approaches to address the internal failures of formal 
law so as to increase the legitimacy of the law and therefore inspire greater compliance 
with it by citizens. 
• There is a need to design enforcement and implementation programmes in a more 
participatory manner by taking a bottom-up approach. 
• There is a need to address the conflict between formal law on the one hand and religion 
and custom on the other hand to achieve social legitimacy within formal criminal law.  
Research implications 
• Our research suggests that FGM/C prevalence needs to be investigated employing 
methods that use indirect means of questioning because of the tendency to under-report 
criminalised conduct that is rooted in tradition, such as FGM/C.  
• Further research into how social legitimacy might be achieved for the formal criminal law 
that prohibits FGM/C is necessary in order to inform policy interventions aimed at 
ensuring the implementation and enforcement of the law.  
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Appendix: Supplementary tables 
Table A2. Conflict-resolution mechanisms for each type of dispute 
  Disputes over  
land (N=486) 
Domestic  
disputes (N=303) 
Disputes over  
debts (N=24) 
Political disputes 
(N=54) 
Ethnic disputes 
(N=152) 
Other 
(N=181) 
Total 
(N=1200) 
 National government 41.6 34.3 25.0 44.4 15.1 29.3 34.3 
 County government 7.6 8.3 16.7 14.8 5.9 7.7 8.1 
 Religious authorities 7.0 5.0 4.2 7.4 2.0 4.4 5.4 
 Community elders 41.2 49.5 45.8 29.6 75.7 52.5 48.9 
 Somebody else 1.4 2.0 4.2 3.7 0.7 2.8 1.8 
 Don’t know 1.2 1.0 4.2 0.0 0.7 3.3 1.4 
Table A3. Types of disputes and existing conflict-resolution mechanisms in Kenya by ethnicity and gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F (N=103) M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=102) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Types of Disputes              
Over land 47.6 74.0 35.3 32.0 47.4 31.3 44.9 33.0 7.1 37.0 58.8 84.0 
Domestic 24.3 10.0 16.7 49.0 23.2 43.4 15.3 58.0 0.0 1.0 16.5 3.0 
Over debts 0.0 1.0 10.8 0.0 2.1 6.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 
Political 20.4 6.0 2.9 2.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 5.0 
Ethnic 7.8 8.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 61.2 48.0 11.3 8.0 
Other 0.0 1.0 28.4 17.0 27.4 13.1 37.8 7.0 31.6 14.0 0.0 0.0 
Existing Community level 
conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
            
National government 63.1 45.0 8.8 20.0 56.8 50.5 51.0 61.0 9.2 2.0 43.3 1.0 
County government 7.8 3.0 10.8 3.0 1.1 15.2 14.3 11.0 1.0 4.0 26.8 0.0 
Religious authorities 5.8 4.0 3.9 4.0 9.5 5.1 4.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 17.0 
Community elders 23.3 48.0 74.5 69.0 19.0 26.3 23.5 26.0 86.7 94.0 13.4 82.0 
Somebody else 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 6.3 3.0 4.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 7.4 0.0 3.1 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
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Table A4. Knowledge about legality/illegality of FGM/C by ethnicity and by gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F  
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F  
(N=102) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
 (N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
 (N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F  
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F  
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Familiar with FGM/C (Yes) 100.0 100.0 99.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.9 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Is FGM/C legal in Kenya 
Yes 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 5.2 1.0 13.0 8.3 1.0 
No 100.0 100.0 99.0 98.0 97.9 96.0 100.0 94.9 92.9 62.0 89.7 98.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 23.0 2.1 1.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Familiar with Riding on a 
motorbike without a helmet 
(Yes) 
100.0 100.0 97.1 100.0 100.0 98.0 93.9 99.0 78.6 81.0 99.0 100.0 
Is riding on a motorbike without a helmet legal in Kenya 
Yes 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.2 0.0 1.1 6.3 1.3 1.2 6.3 2.0 
No 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.0 90.5 100.0 96.7 92.7 79.2 75.3 79.2 97.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.3 0.0 2.2 1.0 19.5 23.5 14.6 1.0 
Familiar with paying police 
bribe to avoid punishment 
(Yes) 
87.4 99.0 95.1 96.0 90.5 97.0 93.9 88.0 58.2 67.0 92.8 100.0 
Is paying police a bribe to avoid punishment legal in Kenya 
Yes 1.1 0.0 4.1 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 10.5 6.0 8.9 2.0 
No 98.9 100.0 91.8 94.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.9 77.2 74.6 85.6 98.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 4.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 12.3 19.4 5.6 0.0 
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Table A5. Source of information about customary and formal law about FGM/C in Kenya, by ethnicity and by gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
Source of information 
about: 
F (N=103) M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=102) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Formal law             
Radio 14.6 22.0 70.6 73.0 51.6 45.5 61.2 78.0 33.7 29.0 15.5 29.0 
Television 82.5 31.0 2.9 3.0 9.5 12.1 6.1 5.0 2.0 4.0 56.7 54.0 
Newspaper/magazines 1.0 26.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 7.1 3.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 
Family/friends 1.9 1.0 4.9 1.0 2.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 23.5 10.0 9.3 0.0 
Observation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.0 4.1 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Elected officials 0.0 5.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Community elders 0.0 1.0 4.9 2.0 3.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 20.4 2.0 1.0 0.0 
Chief/assistant chief 0.0 8.0 2.0 1.0 28.4 28.3 1.0 0.0 10.2 23.0 8.3 4.0 
NGOs 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.3 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Police 0.0 1.0 4.9 6.0 2.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 4.0 6.9 12.0 2.1 4.0 3.1 6.0 9.2 10.0 7.2 3.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
Customary law             
Radio 8.7 0.0 8.8 2.0 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.1 0.0 
Television 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 0.0 
Family/friends 3.9 0.0 37.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 39.8 1.0 8.2 3.0 19.6 0.0 
Observation 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 1.1 2.0 1.0 13.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Elected officials 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Community elders 87.4 97.0 42.2 83.0 69.5 61.6 39.8 80.0 72.5 79.0 33.0 100.0 
Religious authorities 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chief/assistant chief 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 27.4 31.3 4.1 1.0 7.1 2.0 6.2 0.0 
NGOs 0.0 3.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 30.9 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 4.9 6.0 1.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 4.1 9.0 4.1 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.1 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A6. Motivations for obeying Kenya’s formal law, by ethnicity and by gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F  
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
What motivates YOU most to follow the formal law? 
Respect for the law 81.6 70.0 54.9 61.0 51.6 48.5 72.5 68.0 48.0 43.0 47.4 81.0 
Pleasure from following one’s 
conscience 
4.9 3.0 12.8 0.0 12.6 19.2 12.2 2.0 2.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 
Social esteem 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 4.0 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fear of legal punishment 13.6 25.0 21.6 27.0 33.7 26.3 9.2 20.0 21.4 13.0 47.4 18.0 
Fear of guilty conscience 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Fear of social punishment 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 6.9 12.0 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.0 15.3 24.0 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 4.1 12.0 1.0 0.0 
What motivates OTHERS most to follow the formal law? 
Respect for the law 75.7 75.0 50.0 53.0 42.1 26.3 45.9 16.0 56.1 40.0 18.6 50.0 
Pleasure from following one’s 
conscience 
2.9 0.0 2.9 0.0 11.6 16.2 6.1 5.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Social esteem 1.9 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 5.1 12.0 2.0 0.0 62.9 49.0 
Fear of legal punishment 18.5 23.0 31.4 38.0 34.7 51.5 22.5 63.0 27.6 14.0 1.0 0.0 
Fear of guilty conscience 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.1 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fear of social punishment 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 0.0 5.9 4.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 5.1 18.0 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 1.0 0.0 4.9 4.0 9.5 3.0 13.3 1.0 5.1 19.0 16.5 0.0 
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Table A7. Proportion of respondents citing various situations when disobeying Kenya’s formal law and community customs is permissible, by 
ethnicity and gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F  
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Reasons people would say that disobeying Kenya’s formal law is permissible 
Contradiction with religion 11.7  5.0 5.9  10.0 0.00  25.3 4.1  18.0 0.0  1.0 66.0  87.0 
Contradiction with custom 6.8  9.0 6.9  49.0 16.8  3.0 4.1  18.0 39.8  34.0 15.5  7.0 
I do not agree with the law 34.0  1.0 34.3  60.0 3.2  10.1 23.5  5.0 0.0  7.0 0.0  3.0 
Authorities do not respect the law 62.1  73.0 10.8  65.0 37.9  45.5 6.1  17.0 11.2  6.0 3.1  6.0 
No penalties in case on non-application 5.8  30.0 2.9  3.0 9.5  15.2 7.1  6.0 5.1  3.0 22.7  1.0 
Other 0.0  18.0 20.6  21.0 6.3  39.4 14.3  39.0 22.5  22.0 1.0  1.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 23.5  1.0 28.4  2.0 42.9  17.0 21.4  41.0 11.3  2.0 
Reasons people would say that disobeying community customs is permissible  
Contradiction with religion 77.7  54.0 49.0  57.0 3.2  26.3 6.1  66.0 1.0  3.0 75.3  95.0 
Contradiction with the formal law 7.8  11.0 12.8  68.0 25.3  18.2 31.6  34.0 7.1  13.0 9.3  36.0 
Too restrictive 37.9  57.0 2.9  24.0 40.0  50.5 18.4  0.0 41.8  5.0 34.0  2.0 
Inter-mixing with customs from a different 
ethnic community 
19.4  26.0 1.96  47.0 8.4  8.1 2.0  6.0 5.1  2.0 7.2  0.0 
Other 0.0  3.0 23.5  22.0 3.2  29.3 10.2  14.0 34.7  33.0 2.1  0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 16.7  3.0 20.0  8.1 37.8  5.0 13.3 47.0 5.2  0.0 
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Table A8. Acceptability of disobeying Kenyan formal law, by ethnicity and by gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F (N=103) M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Is it acceptable to break Kenyan formal law: 
If this law is clearly against one’s moral principles? 
Yes 46.6 31.0 25.5 17.0 8.4 10.1 14.3 56.0 13.3 18.0 93.8 65.0 
No 50.5 68.0 72.6 82.0 91.6 89.9 85.7 44.0 83.7 62.0 5.2 32.0 
Don’t know 2.9 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 19.0 1.0 3.0 
If one would find it too costly to obey this law? 
Yes 35.0 26.0 25.5 27.0 3.2 7.1 16.3 33.0 16.3 27.0 85.6 47.0 
No 64.1 73.0 69.6 73.0 96.8 91.9 80.6 67.0 78.6 58.0 14.4 50.0 
Don’t know 1.0 1.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 3.1 15.0 0.0 1.0 
If one knows that this law is not enforced? 
Yes 22.3 16.0 24.5 50.0 4.2 7.1 11.2 24.0 20.4 34.0 94.9 34.0 
No 77.7 83.0 72.6 50.0 94.7 92.9 86.7 74.0 76.5 55.0 4.1 65.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 11.0 0.0 1.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
If one knows that most of the people he or she knows best do not follow this law? 
Yes 20.4 15.0 11.8 61.0 0.0 6.1 9.2 16.0 8.2 26.0 49.5 40.0 
No 79.6 84.0 81.4 38.0 100.0 92.9 88.8 84.0 91.8 64.0 49.5 60.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 6.9 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 
If one knows that most of the people he or she knows best would approve of breaking this law? 
Yes 18.5 11.0 9.8 36.0 0.0 4.0 12.2 13.0 12.2 19.0 46.4 38.0 
No 81.6 89.0 87.3 64.0 100.0 96.0 84.7 86.0 87.8 65.0 51.6 61.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.1 1.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 
If one does not know about this law? 
Yes 34.0 10.0 17.7 61.0 5.3 23.2 14.3 38.0 20.4 75.0 95.9 52.0 
No 66.0 89.0 69.6 38.0 93.7 74.8 82.7 62.0 77.6 14.0 3.1 46.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 12.8 1.0 1.1 2.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 
If one thinks that this law was made without representing the interests of people like him or her? 
Yes 88.4 31.0 23.5 62.0 22.1 11.1 15.3 22.0 16.3 67.0 80.4 43.0 
No 11.7 68.0 73.5 38.0 76.8 88.9 80.6 78.0 79.6 32.0 18.6 57.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.0 1.1 0.0 4.1 0.0 4.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 
If one thinks this law is enforced unfairly? 
Yes 92.2 34.0 38.2 74.0 23.2 30.3 20.4 34.0 24.5 84.0 97.9 62.0 
No 7.8 65.0 58.8 26.0 72.6 67.7 73.5 66.0 74.5 13.0 2.1 36.0 
Don’t Know 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.0 4.2 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A9. Proportion of respondents who believe that people in their community practise FGM/C, by ethnicity and gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F 
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Do you think that people in your community practise FGM/C? 
Yes 50.5 98.0 3.0 27.0 59.0 34.3 37.9 25.8 95.9 97.0 95.9 76.0 
No 49.5 2.0 96.0 73.0 35.8 62.6 60.0 73.2 2.0 1.0 2.1 14.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 5.3 3.0 2.1 1.0 2.0 0.0 2.1 10.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Do you think that people in your community practise riding a motorbike without a helmet? 
Yes 90.1 100.0 74.8 99.0 99.0 99.0 92.3 99.0 93.6 93.8 100.0 98.0 
No 9.9 0.0 23.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 7.7 1.0 6.4 6.3 0.0 2.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Do you think that people in your community practise paying police a bribe to avoid punishment? 
Yes 95.6 100.0 60.8 96.9 96.4 93.8 84.6 88.2 89.7 75.8 100.0 100.0 
No 3.3 0.0 26.8 0.0 2.3 3.1 11.0 8.2 3.5 12.1 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 1.1 0.0 12.4 3.1 2.3 3.1 4.4 3.5 6.9 12.1 0.0 0.0 
Refused to answer             
How many girls in your community do you think are cut? 
All girls 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 20.0 25.8 0.0 
Most girls 39.8 60.0 4.0 1.0 29.5 26.3 12.6 1.0 29.6 69.0 52.6 64.0 
Some girls 4.9 24.0 0.0 3.0 23.2 18.2 10.5 4.1 9.2 8.0 14.4 14.0 
A few girls 50.5 10.0 2.0 15.0 10.5 24.2 36.8 36.1 3.1 0.0 4.1 10.0 
No girl 4.9 0.0 94.1 78.0 20.0 21.2 36.8 54.6 5.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 5.0 0.0 3.0 16.8 10.1 3.2 4.1 3.1 3.0 2.1 12.0 
How many women in your community do you think are cut? 
All women 74.8 46.0 6.9 3.0 40.0 3.0 17.9 5.2 69.4 76.0 79.4 32.0 
Most women 25.2 46.0 45.5 77.0 51.6 60.6 68.4 33.0 29.6 20.0 18.6 68.0 
Some women 0.0 5.0 25.7 9.0 4.2 23.2 8.4 17.5 0.0 1.0 2.1 0.0 
A few women 0.0 1.0 14.9 6.0 1.1 2.0 3.2 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
No woman 0.0 1.0 5.9 5.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 24.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.2 9.1 2.1 3.1 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table A10. Continuation/discontinuation of FGM/C, by ethnicity and gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F 
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
Why do you think people in your community continue to practise FGM/C? 
Everyone else does it 1.9 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 16.3 1.0 2.1 2.0 
Religious obligations 1.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 
Tradition 96.1 94.0 10.9 93.0 92.6 75.8 80.0 90.7 74.5 93.0 91.8 94.0 
There are few penalties for 
doing so 
  0.0 2.0 0.0 3.0 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 0.0 1.0 57.4 3.0 0.0 9.1 10.5 4.1 7.1 2.0 3.1 1.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 31.7 1.0 7.4 4.0 5.3 4.1 0.0 4.0 0.0 3.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
If everyone else in your community were to discontinue FGM/C, would you continue to do it? 
Yes 3.9 7.0 2.0 1.0 2.1 6.1 0.0 2.1 19.4 33.0 18.6 5.0 
No 96.1 93.0 98.0 98.0 97.9 92.9 100.0 97.9 78.6 58.0 81.4 95.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 
In your opinion, when someone is deciding whether to practise FGM/C, how much consideration do they give to whether or not others are doing it? 
A lot of consideration 56.3 64.0 30.7 61.0 11.6 24.2 54.7 78.4 85.7 58.0 14.4 50.0 
Some consideration 10.7 29.0 6.9 20.0 19.0 47.5 7.4 5.2 9.2 5.0 26.8 1.0 
Not much consideration 25.2 5.0 5.9 5.0 6.3 9.1 3.2 3.1 1.0 5.0 29.9 18.0 
No consideration 7.8 2.0 51.5 12.0 55.8 18.2 32.6 12.4 2.0 30.0 26.8 30.0 
Don’t Know 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.0 7.4 1.0 2.1 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.0 
Do you believe that FGM/C should continue, or should it be stopped? 
Continued 10.7 4.0 5.0 8.0 2.1 5.1 0.0 3.1 29.6 63.0 13.4 5.0 
Stopped 89.3 96.0 94.1 91.0 96.8 92.9 100.0 96.9 68.4 33.0 85.6 95.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 
 53 
Table A11. Social costs and benefits of FGM/C, by ethnicity and gender 
 Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
  F 
(N=103) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=101) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=99) 
F 
(N=95) 
M 
(N=97) 
F 
(N=98) 
M 
(N=100) 
F 
(N=97) 
M 
(N=100) 
What would you do if you found out a neighbour was going to practise FGM/C? 
Nothing 7.8 18.0 11.9 12.0 16.8 13.1 11.6 6.2 53.1 66.0 36.1 8.0 
Call the telephone hotline 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Notify the police 7.8 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.1 13.1 5.3 4.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 
Notify a social worker 0.0 18.0 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 7.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Notify the chief 40.8 16.0 40.5 50.0 33.7 65.7 59.0 75.3 11.2 3.0 42.3 75.0 
Notify the health worker 1.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Inform a local NGO 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Talk to a family member 41.8 24.0 3.0 11.0 6.3 0.0 1.1 4.1 8.2 1.0 11.3 1.0 
In your opinion, is life in the village more difficult or less difficult for uncut women?  
Much more difficult 4.9 9.0 8.9 20.0 1.1 2.0 5.3 9.3 78.6 70.0 30.9 29.0 
Somewhat more difficult  3.9 17.0 5.9 0.0 31.6 15.2 1.1 6.2 8.2 23.0 11.3 3.0 
Neither more or less difficult 3.9 14.0 40.6 1.0 33.7 22.2 45.3 33.0 6.1 1.0 2.1 4.0 
Somewhat less difficult 1.0 13.0 1.0 3.0 1.1 6.1 3.2 3.1 1.0 0.0 16.5 11.0 
Much less difficult 86.4 46.0 40.6 73.0 17.9 40.4 45.3 48.5 2.0 1.0 30.9 31.0 
Don’t know 0.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 14.7 14.1 0.0 0.0 4.1 5.0 8.3 22.0 
Would your neighbours approve or disapprove if you cut your daughter? 
Approve strongly 2.9 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 54.1 49.0 22.7 0.0 
Approve 6.8 3.0 2.0 5.0 11.6 21.2 1.1 6.2 29.6 38.0 62.9 3.0 
Disapprove 48.5 81.0 38.6 20.0 80.0 63.6 16.8 54.6 11.2 7.0 4.1 70.0 
Disapprove strongly 41.8 14.0 50.5 70.0 1.1 11.1 76.8 38.1 1.0 4.0 2.1 4.0 
Don’t know 0.0 2.0 6.9 3.0 7.4 4.0 1.1 1.0 3.1 0.0 8.3 23.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
Something else 1.0 14.0 39.6 20.0 36.8 8.1 19.1 10.3 16.3 23.0 6.2 5.0 
Don't know 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.0 6.0 2.1 0.0 
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Table A12. Endorsement experiment: Proportion of those who would support or oppose an FGM/C abandonment programme targeting parents, by 
ethnicity and gender 
  Borana Kipsigis Kisii Maasai Samburu Somali 
Support or oppose regardless of who 
support/funds the programme  
F 
N=27 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=23 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=23 
M 
N=25 
Support strongly 48.2 64.0 96.0 80.0 12.5 48.0 87.5 80.0 41.7 0.0 17.4 32.0 
Support 40.7 28.0 4.0 0.0 87.5 52.0 4.2 16.0 33.3 32.0 69.6 60.0 
Oppose 11.1 8.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 4.0 8.3 20.0 13.0 8.0 
Oppose strongly 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 16.7 28.0 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
Refused to answer 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Support or oppose programme supported by 
community elders 
F 
N=26 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
Support strongly 53.9 60.0 77.8 72.0 18.2 41.7 96.0 70.8 68.0 4.0 20.8 48.0 
Support 30.8 24.0 14.8 4.0 81.8 45.8 4.0 20.8 20.0 28.0 58.3 52.0 
Oppose 7.7 12.0 3.7 8.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 8.3 8.0 16.0 20.8 0.0 
Oppose strongly 7.7 4.0 3.7 8.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 4.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 
Don’t know 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 
Support or oppose programme supported by 
Kenyan government 
F 
N=26 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=24 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
Support strongly 64.0 52.0 100.0 76.0 28.0 44.0 100.0 87.5 54.2 12.0 16.0 44.0 
Support 24.0 20.0 0.0 16.0 68.0 40.0 0.0 8.3 20.8 24.0 76.0 52.0 
Oppose 4.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.0 8.0 4.0 
Oppose strongly 8.0 8.0 0.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 12.5 48.0 0.0 0.0 
Support or oppose programme supported by 
religious leaders 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=24 
M 
N=24 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
F 
N=25 
M 
N=25 
Support strongly 48.0 48.0 70.8 96.0 8.3 44.0 95.5 83.3 64.0 8.0 20.0 52.0 
Support 44.0 44.0 25.0 0.0 83.3 52.0 4.6 12.5 20.0 20.0 60.0 48.0 
Oppose 4.0 8.0 4.2 0.0 8.3 4.0 0.0 4.2 8.0 24.0 12.0 0.0 
Oppose strongly 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 48.0 8.0 0.0 
 
 
 
